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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
CaseNo.20050535-CA
JEFFREY HOUSTON,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from convictions on thirteen counts of possessing a controlled
substance precursor, all second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§§ 58-37c-3(12)(k) and 58-37c-l 1(2), in the Seventh Judicial District, Emery County, the
Honorable Bryce K. Bryner presiding.1 This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Defendant claims that the trial court deprived him of his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel at trial. Where defendant has failed to provide this Court with an
adequate record upon which to review his claim, must this Court assume the regularity of
the proceedings below?
No standard of review applies to this issue.

1

Unless otherwise stated, all citations to the code are to the West 2004
publication.

2. Was pretrial counsel ineffective for not pursuing a motion to suppress
defendant's confession based on defendant's unsupported claims that (a) his arrest was
illegal and (b) he invoked the right to counsel during the police interrogation?
Defendant claims for the first time on appeal that his confession followed an
illegal arrest and that pretrial counsel failed to seek suppression on this basis. "An
ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal, presents a
question of law." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25,1f 6, 89 P.3d 162.
Defendant claimed in a motion for a new trial that police officers continued to
interrogate him after he invoked the right to counsel and that pretrial counsel failed to
seek suppression on this basis. Where an ineffective assistance claim is first raised in a
motion for a new trial, this Court reviews the trial court's decision to deny the motion for
an abuse of discretion. See State v. Eisner, 2001 UT 99, If 31, 37 P.3d 1073 (citation
omitted). This Court "assume[s] that the trial court exercised proper discretion unless the
record clearly shows the contrary." State v. Hoffhine, 2001 UT 4, ^ 25, 20 P.3d 265
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following relevant statute is reproduced in context in Addendum A:
"Unlawful conduct" as defined in Section 58-1-501 includes knowingly and
intentionally . . . obtaining or attempting to obtain or to possess any
controlled substance precursor or any combination of controlled substance
precursors knowing or having a reasonable cause to believe that the
controlled substance precursor is intended to be used in the unlawful
manufacture of any controlled substance.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-3(12)(k).
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On January 6, 2003, defendant was charged by information with a second-degree
felony for possessing a controlled substance precursor in violation of the Controlled
Substance Precursor Act. Rl. At his initial appearance, the trial court advised defendant
of the charges and penalties against him and of his right to counsel. R3. Defendant said
that he would hire his own attorney. See R3-4 (Minutes, reproduced in Addendum B).
He retained Margret Sidwell Taylor to represent him, and she appeared for him on
February 4, 2003. Rll-12. On May 5, 2003, the State filed an amended information
charging defendant with seventeen counts of possessing a controlled substance precursor
in violation of the Act. R27-31. Trial was set for November 18, 2004. R270.
On November 17, 2004, Ms. Taylor informed the court that the parties had
reached a plea agreement. R280. When the parties appeared the following day, however,
the court found that defendant was not prepared to enter a guilty plea. Id. Ms. Taylor
moved to withdraw as counsel, and the court granted her request, as "there appear[ed] to
be a conflict between the defendant] and his counsel." Id. The court reset the jury trial
for January 26, 2005, and ordered that defendant appear with new counsel on December
7,2004. Id. No transcript of the proceeding is included in the record. iSreeR279-81
(Minutes, reproduced in Addendum B).
On December 7, 2004, D. Bruce Oliver entered his appearance as counsel. R286.
That same day, defendant appeared before the court, the court found that he had
employed Mr. Oliver, and the court set a further pretrial hearing for January 4, 2005.

3

R288-89. No transcript of the proceeding is included in the record. See R288-89
(Minutes, reproduced in Addendum B).
On December 16, 2004, Mr. Oliver moved to withdraw as counsel, stating that he
had not received a retainer and that he had not been able to communicate with defendant
since December 7, 2004. R300.
On December 21, 2004, the court held another hearing on the matter. R302.
Defendant, who could not be found, was not present. R3 02-03. No transcript of the
proceeding is included in the record. See id. (Minutes, reproduced in Addendum B).
On January 4, 2005, the court held a pretrial conference. R309. Defendant was
present. Id. The court advised defendant of Mr. Oliver's motion to withdraw, questioned
defendant about it, and found based on his answers that Mr. Oliver had withdrawn
"because the defendant failed to keep in touch with him." R310. The court further found
that defendant had fulltime employment and did not qualify for a public defender. Id.
"The Court urged the defendant to do whatever it takes to secure counsel for himself."
Id. No transcript of the proceeding is included in the record. See R309-10 (Minutes,
reproduced in Addendum B).
On January 19, 2005, the trial court held a pretrial conference. R319. Defendant
appeared and "informed the court that he ha[d] not hired counsel." R319-20. The court
told defendant that the trial would "go forward as set to begin on January 26 and 27,
2005." Id. The court also found that defendant "ha[d] had ample time to hire counsel."
Id. No transcript of the proceeding is included in the record. See R319-20 (Minutes,
reproduced in Addendum B).
4

Trial was held January 26, 27, and 28, 2005. R331-42. The court noted that no
defense counsel was present and asked defendant whether he had hired an attorney to
represent him. R543:5. Defendant stated that he had not. Id. The court also noted that
defendant had faxed an affidavit of indigency to the court just before midnight on January
24, 2005. R543:5. The court found the affidavit, filed "essentially one day before the
trial," was late. R543:7, 11. Moreover, it was incomplete. Id. Defendant had not
completed "the very first question" which asked "who [his] employer [wa]s, what [his]
monthly net income [wa]s, and what [his] monthly gross income [wa]s." R543:6.
The court further noted that only three weeks before on January 4, 2005, it had
found that defendant was employed full-time and "suggested on the record that [he] did
not qualify for a [p]ublic [d]efender." R543:l 1. The court observed, however, that at the
January 19, 2005 hearing, the court had "advised the defendant that he could file an
affidavit of indigency, but that it would have to be done immediately." Id. Instead, "one
day before the trial, the defendant filed an affidavit. But once again, the affidavit was not
complete." Id.
The court found that "the defendant ha[d] had ample time to employ counsel" and
"ample opportunity to submit an affidavit... requesting that counsel be appointed, if he
could not [afford] counsel." Id. The court concluded that it "just ha[d] no other option
but to go ahead with the t r i a l . . . at th[at] time." Id.
The State then filed a second amended information, reducing the charges against
the defendant from seventeen counts to thirteen counts. R327-30, 593:13-14. Trial
proceeded and the jury returned guilty verdicts on all thirteen counts. R379-80. On
5

March 16, 2005, the court entered judgment, sentencing defendant to thirteen concurrent
prison terms of one-to-fifteen years. R405-06.
On March 24, 2005, defendant filed a motion for a new trial. R408-26 (Motion for
New Trial and Memorandum Supporting Motion for New Trial, reproduced in
Addendum C). Defendant claimed, among other things, that the trial was unfair because
the court "forced [him] to act as his own attorney." R420. He claimed, more
specifically, that the trial court had led him "to believe that counsel would be appointed
for him at trial by his submission of an affidavit of indigency immediately'' R421
(emphasis in original). He also claimed that pretrial counsel Taylor was deficient for
abandoning a motion to suppress. R418. He claimed that he requested an attorney while
being interrogated, but that the officers proceeded without addressing his request. Id.
On May 27, 2005, the trial court denied the motion. R522-27 (Ruling on Motion
for New Trial, reproduced in Addendum C). The court rejected defendant's claim that
he had been improperly forced to act as his own attorney and found that he "ha[d] not
provided a transcript, affidavit, or other evidence to support this assertion" that the trial
court had misled him. R526. The court stated, "[A]fter Ms. Margret Taylor's services
were terminated on November 18, 2004, the court ordered defendant to appear before the
court on several occasions to advise the court on his progress on hiring counsel. Each
time the court admonished. . . the importance of employing counsel but defendant
procrastinated the hiring of counsel even though he was working in the coal mines." Id.
(emphasis added). The court also found that defendant did not request an attorney
during his interrogation. R523. On June 13, 2005, defendant appealed. R529.
6

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The crime
On thirteen different occasions between September 1999 and December 2002,
defendant purchased large quantities of crystal iodine from the Emery Animal Health
Clinic, a veterinary hospital. R543:49-50, 545:10-12. The clinic kept a record of the
transactions. R343, 543:49, 55, 57. Defendant purchased approximately two pounds of
crystal iodine in 2001 and approximately nine pounds in 2002. R544:34, 37-38.
Defendant admitted to a police officer that he resold some of the iodine for use in the
manufacture of methamphetamine, that he made a profit, and that he took the sales price
in cash or in methamphetamine. R496-97.
Defendant's version
Defendant claimed that he confessed out of fear. R544:23-24. He testified that he
was a licensed farrier (blacksmith) and bought the iodine only for use in re-shoeing
horses. R544:13. He claimed it could be used for laminitis (inflammation of the hoof)
and for thrush. R544:18, 20. He claimed that the large quantities he purchased could be
explained in various ways, i.e., he misplaced the iodine and had to buy more,
R544:24-25; someone else purchased some of the iodine using his name, R544:34;
someone stole iodine from his truck, R544:27; and he spilled iodine when shoeing the
horses. R544:65.
Rebuttal to defendant's version
The State cross-examined defendant regarding his claim that he was a licensed
farrier. R544:15. Defendant conceded that he was not licensed as a farrier in Utah and
7

did not claim to be licensed in any other state. R544:16. He merely claimed to have
completed a six-week farrier training course. Id.
Farrier Leonard Rogers testified for the State. R543:81. Rogers testified that an
iodine/turpentine mixture is sometimes used to harden a horse's hoof when the hoof has
been cut too short. R543:84-85. He did not use iodine for that purpose, nor did any of
the other farriers that he knew, as other products worked better and crystal iodine could
"founder [disable or lame] a horse.'5 R543:86, 88. He had never heard of crystal iodine
being used for thrush. R543:85. He testified that, if used for hardening a hoof, a quarter
of an ounce of crystal iodine would suffice. R543:87. Asked if he could imagine "any
occasion where a person, a farrier might want—need to use nine pounds of crystal iodine
in a—one-year time period," he answered, "No." R543:88. Asked again, "Any
conceivable way that you could use that in a year," he again answered, "No." Id.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Despite repeated warnings that trial would proceed even if he did not obtain
counsel, defendant appeared for trial without having retained an attorney and without
having completed an affidavit of indigency. The court found that he had had ample
opportunity to hire counsel or to establish indigency and required him to proceed pro se.
Defendant claims that he did not voluntarily and knowingly waive his right to counsel
and the trial court unconstitutionally deprived him of his right to counsel. Defendant has
not provided an adequate record upon which this Court may review his claim.
The limited record defendant has provided on appeal does not support his claim.
Rather, it indicates that the trial court repeatedly warned defendant of the consequences
8

of continued dilatory conduct. It also suggests that the court warned defendant of the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.
More significantly, however, because of the limited nature of the record, defendant
is fatally handicapped in asserting trial court error. He has not included in the record
transcripts of any of the hearings during which the court discussed with him the need to
either retain counsel or establish indigency and in which the court admonished him of the
importance of employing counsel. This Court must therefore presume the regularity of
the proceedings below. It must assume that the trial court advised defendant that it would
treat continuing failure to retain counsel and refusal to provide affidavit support for a
claim of indigency as a request to proceed pro se, making defendant's waiver voluntary.
It must also assume that the court explained to defendant the dangers and disadvantages
of self-representation, making the waiver knowing and intelligent.
Defendant also claims that pretrial counsel, who filed a motion to suppress but did
not file a memorandum in support of the motion, was ineffective for not pursuing it.
Defendant asserts that, had pretrial counsel pursued a motion to suppress, the State would
have been barred from using his confession at trial. He claims, specifically, that his
confession was unlawfully obtained because (1) it followed an illegal arrest and
(2) sometime during the police interrogation he invoked the right to counsel.
Defendant's arrest, however, was lawful. The officers who effected the arrest had
probable cause to believe that defendant had committed two offenses: obtaining a
controlled substance precursor with the intent that it be used in the unlawful manufacture
of methamphetamine, and driving an unregistered vehicle. Further, defendant, who
9

agreed to talk with the officers after they gave him his Miranda warnings, did not invoke
the right to counsel during the police interrogation. Pursuing a motion to suppress would
therefore have been futile. As counsel is not required to make futile motions and
requests, pretrial counsel did not perform deficiently when she abandoned the motion to
suppress. Moreover, defendant was not prejudiced.
ARGUMENT
I.
DEFENDANT CLAIMS THAT THE TRIAL COURT DEPRIVED
HIM OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL; BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS
NOT PROVIDED THIS COURT WITH AN ADEQUATE RECORD
UPON WHICH TO REVIEW HIS CLAIM, THIS COURT SHOULD
PRESUME THE REGULARITY OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Defendant claims that the trial court deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel at trial. Br. Aplt. at l.2 He claims that the court "forced [him] to represent
himself, without either the benefit of counsel or a knowing intelligent waiver of
assistance of counsel." Id. Defendant's claim fails because he has not provided this
Court with an adequate record to support his allegations.
A.

By his conduct, a defendant may voluntarily waive the right to counsel. The
trial court must ensure, however, that the waiver is knowing and intelligent.
A defendant may waive the right to counsel by affirmatively seeking permission to

represent himself or by engaging in conduct which the court treats as a request to proceed

2

Defendant also claims that "counsel inappropriately waived [his] right to a
preliminary hearing without his consent or knowledge" and "her personal agenda to
legalize drugs actually resulted in additional charges against him in the State's two
amended informations." Br. Aplt. at 33. Defendant does not develop these claims, and
the State does not address them.
10

pro se. Most waiver cases involve affirmative representations, or true waiver. This case
involves waiver by conduct, also called implied waiver.
True waiver. A defendant may "affirmatively request[] permission to proceed
pro se." State v. Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, \ 28. This is a true waiver, "the most common
method by which defendants forsake their right to counsel." Id. "When a defendant
requests to proceed pro se, his waiver will be valid only if he acts knowingly and
intelligently, being aware of the dangers inherent in self-representation." Id. at ^f 29. The
defendant must be "'made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation,
so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made
with eyes open.'" State v. McDonald, 922 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah App. 1996) (quoting
Faretta v. California, All U.S. 806, 835 (1975)).
"The most reliable way for a trial court to determine whether a defendant is aware
of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation is to engage in a colloquy on the
record." Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, \ 29. A defendant may, however, under the
circumstances of a particular case, knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel

A defendant may also forfeit his right to counsel. "Unlike waiver, 'forfeiture
results in the loss of a right regardless of the defendant's knowledge thereof and
irrespective of whether the defendant intended to relinquish the right.'" State v.
Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, % 31 (quoting United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1100 (3d
Cir. 1995)). "[A] defendant may be deemed to have forfeited his right to counsel when
he engages in 'extremely dilatory conduct' or abusive behavior, such as physically
assaulting counsel." Id. at ^ 32 (quoting Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1101). When a defendant
engages in conduct extreme enough "to constitute forfeiture, a court need not determine
whether a defendant understands the risks of self-representation or warn him that he will
lose his right to counsel." Id.
11

even without a colloquy. Id. Where there is no colloquy, the reviewing court "will look
at any evidence in the record which shows a defendant's actual awareness of the risks of
proceeding pro se." State v. Valencia, 2001 UT App 159, % 22, 27 P.3d 573 (citing State
v. Frampton, 137 P.2d 183, 188 (Utah 1987)); see also State v. Hassan, 2004 UT 99,
f 22, 108 P.3d 695 (recommending colloquy, but stating that court will "look at any
evidence in the record which shows a defendant's actual awareness of the risks of
proceeding pro se").
Waiver by conduct or implied waiver. A defendant may also waive his right to
counsel by his conduct. This is "often referred to as implied waiver." Pedockie, 2006
UT 28, f 33. "'Once a defendant has been warned that he will lose his attorney if he
engages in dilatory tactics, any misconduct thereafter may be treated as an implied
request to proceed pro se and thus, as a waiver of the right to counsel.'" Id. (quoting
United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1100 (3d Cir. 1995)). "[A] defendant need not
intend to relinquish the right to counsel." Id. But "he must have been warned that
continuation of the unacceptable conduct will result in a waiver of the right to counsel."
Id.
One of the most common circumstances giving rise to waiver by conduct is the
failure of a defendant to retain counsel after having been warned that trial will proceed
even if he does not do so.4

When a defendant "fail[s] to secure an attorney for trial,"

4

See United State v. Bauer, 956 F.2d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 1992) ("the combination
of ability to pay for counsel plus refusal to do so does waive the right to counsel at trial"
and constitutes "waiver by conduct"); United States v Kelm, 827 F.2d 1319, 1322 (9th
12

despite having been "given ample time and [having been] warned to obtain an attorney,"
the defendant's failure to act "should be treated as a request to proceed pro se." Id. at
If 35 (citing United States v. Weninger, 624 F.2d 163, 166-67 (10th Cir. 1980).
Sometimes a defendant will assert that he cannot afford to hire an attorney, but
refuse to provide the court with evidence establishing that he is indigent. Failure to
provide evidence of indigency, despite having been given ample opportunity to do so and
warned that it is a prerequisite to appointment of counsel, can result in waiver by conduct
of the right to appointed counsel. See McAfee v. City of Muscle Shoals, 652 So.2d 330,

Cir. 1987) (concluding that continued refusal to retain counsel or to accept appointed
counsel, in an attempt to cause delay, constituted a waiver of counsel); United States v.
Weninger, 624 F.2d 163, 167 (10th Cir. 1980) (concluding that defendant had a
reasonable opportunity to retain counsel, that he was made aware of the dangers of selfrepresentation, and that his "stubborn failure to hire an attorney constituted a knowing
and intelligent waiver of the right to assistance of counsel"); Monte v. State, 690 So. 2d
517, 519 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996) (holding that nonindigent defendant's failure to retain
counsel within a reasonable time supported finding that he waived his right to counsel);
Siniardv. State, 491 So. 2d 1062, 1063-64 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) (concluding that "a
defendant able to retain counsel is entitled to a reasonable time to secure counsel," but
"he may not indefinitely postpone trial by continued applications for more time to seek
representation" and "[w]hether additional time should be granted is within the sound
discretion of the trial court") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); State v.
Morrison, 723 A.2d 869, 870 (Me. 1998) ("Once it is determined that the defendant has
the means to retain counsel, his seemingly stubborn failure to hire an attorney may
constitute a knowing and intelligent waiver."); Painter v. State, 762 P.2d 990, 992 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1988) (concluding that "[fjailure to hire an attorney may constitute a knowing
and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel if done to delay the hearing" and that "[t]he
right to assistance of counsel may not be put to service as a means of delaying or trifling
with the court") (citations omitted); State v. Jacobs, 245 S.E.2d 606, 607-08 (S.C. 1978)
(per curiam) (holding that defendant waived his right to counsel by failing to retain
attorney even though he was financially capable, he was given reasonable time, and the
court advised him to do so).
13

331 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (holding that defendant's failure to submit affidavit of
indigency precluded finding that he was entitled to be represented by appointed counsel).
Sometimes a defendant will fail to secure an attorney after being warned that he
will have to proceed at trial without one and also fail to provide any proof of indigency,
despite having been given adequate opportunity to do so. In such circumstances, a
defendant's failure to act may result in waiver by conduct of the right to appointed
counsel and the right to retained counsel. See United States v. Loy, 164 Fed. Appx. 747,
754, 758 (10th Cir. 2006) (reproduced in Addendum D) (holding that defendant waived
his right to counsel when, after being warned of the need for an attorney, he failed to hire
one, and concluding that waiver was valid even though, had defendant adequately
disclosed his financial circumstances in a timely fashion, he may have qualified for
appointed counsel).
In all of these circumstances, the trial court may treat defendant's conduct as a
request to proceed pro se. Waiver is voluntary not because the defendant intended to
waive representation, but because he voluntarily engaged in the misconduct even though
the court had warned him of the consequences.
An implied waiver, like a true waiver, in addition to being voluntary, must also be
"knowing and intelligent." Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, f 33 (citing Goldberg, 67 F.3d at
1102). In other words, in addition to knowing the consequences of continued
misconduct, the defendant must "possess [] an awareness of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation at the time of the implied waiver." Id.
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"[T]he trial court must ensure that the defendant is cognizant of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation" and that his waiver is therefore knowing and
intelligent. Id. at f 38. The most reliable way for the trial court to do this is by
conducting a colloquy, "comparable in content to the warning given to a defendant who
affirmatively asserts his right to self-representation." Id. at f 38 & n.40. However, a
waiver can be knowing and intelligent even in circumstances where there is no colloquy.
See id. at 129. In those circumstances, the reviewing court "will look at any evidence in
the record which shows a defendant's actual awareness of the risks of proceeding pro se."
Valencia, 2001 UT App 159, If 22 (citation omitted).
B.

A defendant claiming error must provide an adequate record on appeal to
support his allegations. In the face of an inadequate record, a reviewing
court must assume the regularity of the proceedings below.
"Parties claiming error below and seeking appellate review have the duty and

responsibility to support their allegations with an adequate record." State v. Wetzel, 868
P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993); see also State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1162 (Utah App.
1998). "Thus, the appellant has the burden of providing the reviewing court with an
adequate record on appeal to prove his allegations." Call v. City of West Jordan, 788
P.2d 1049, 1052 (Utah App. 1990); accord State v. Wuljfenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah
1982). "[Speculative assignments of error not supported by the record do not constitute
grounds for reversal." State v. Gonzales, 2002 UT App 256, f 20, 56 P.3d 969 (citing
State v. Kirkwood, 2002 UT App 128, 47 P.3d 111).
Indeed, an appellant is "fatally handicapped" if he does not provide an adequate
record on appeal. State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, % 13, 69 P.3d 1278. "[W]hen an
15

appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal, [a reviewing court] presume[s]
the regularity of the proceedings below." Id.; see also State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688,
699 (Utah App. 1995) (assuming regularity of the proceedings below because appellant
failed to include transcript on appeal). "'When crucial matters are not included in the
record, the missing portions are presumed to support the action of the trial court.'"
Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, % 13 (quoting State v. Linden, 761 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah 1988)).
C.

The record is inadequate to permit review defendant's claim, and this Court
must assume the regularity of the proceedings below. This Court must
assume that the trial court adequately warned defendant of both the
consequences of continued dilatory conduct and the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation.
Defendant claims that he could not have voluntarily and knowingly waived the

right to counsel because the trial court did not warn him of the consequences of continued
dilatory conduct or the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. See Br. Aplt. at
33. While the limited record on appeal supports a conclusion that the trial court properly
warned defendant, the record defendant has presented is inadequate to permit review of
his claim. Where the record is inadequate, this Court must presume that "the missing
portions .. . support the action of the trial court." Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, ^ 13. As a
result, defendant is "fatally handicapped" in asserting his claim. Id.
1.

Voluntary waiver by conduct.
Here, the existing record shows that trial court discussed with defendant the need

to retain counsel or to demonstrate indigency so that counsel could be appointed. These
discussions began at defendant's initial appearance on January 7, 2003 when the trial
court advised defendant of the right to counsel and defendant indicated he would hire his
16

own counsel. R3. Defendant retained Margret Taylor, who appeared in February 2003
and served until November 2004. Rl 1-12, 279-80. At a hearing on November 18, 2004,
Ms. Taylor asked to withdraw, and the court granted her request. R279-80. The minute
entry states that the court discussed the matter of new counsel with defendant on that
date. R280. The discussions continued through a series of hearings on December 7,
2004, and January 4 and January 19, 2005. R280, 289, 310, 320. The minute entries
indicate that the trial court "urged the defendant to do whatever it t[ook] to secure
counsel for himself and repeatedly explained to defendant that the trial would proceed as
scheduled and that it was his responsibility to retain counsel. R310, 320.
The record does not indicate that defendant asserted any change in his financial
circumstances after the initial hearing where he indicated he would hire his own attorney.
Moreover, only three weeks before trial, the court found that defendant was employed
fulltime and did not qualify for a public defender. R310. When defendant again
appeared without counsel one week before trial, the court noted that he had had ample
time to retain an attorney and informed him that trial would go forward. R320.
Nevertheless, even at that late date, the court noted that if defendant wanted to
claim indigency and have counsel appointed, he could do so. R332, 543:11. He could
still "file an affidavit of indigency, b u t . . . it would have to be done immediately"
543:11 (emphasis added); see also R332.
Defendant neither retained counsel nor timely filed an affidavit of indigency.
R332. He filed an affidavit on January 24, 2005, just before midnight, and essentially
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one day before trial. The affidavit, however, was incomplete and did not list defendant's
employer, his gross income, or his net income. R543:6.
When defendant appeared without counsel on the morning of trial, the trial court
found that defendant's affidavit of indigency was incomplete and untimely. R543:11.
The court stated that defendant had had "ample time to employ counsel" and "ample
opportunity to submit an affidavit... requesting that counsel be appointed, if he could
not [afford] counsel." Id.5
Thus, the limited record supports a determination that the trial court warned
defendant of the consequences of continuing dilatory conduct and that, by his continuing
misconduct, defendant voluntarily waived his right to counsel. In any event, defendant is
"fatally handicapped" in asserting that the trial court did not warn him of the
consequences that would follow continued dilatory conduct. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, \ 13.
Defendant has not presented a record adequate to support review of his claim. He has not
included in the record transcripts of any of the hearings in which the court advised him of

5

Defendant suggests that the trial court acted improperly when it required
defendant to represent himself because "two days later on January 28, 2005, the trial
court found [him] indigent for sentencing and . . . . appointed counsel. .. because he
couldn't afford an attorney." Br. Aplt. at 22-23. At that point, however, the jury had
returned guilty verdicts and defendant's circumstances had changed. See R340-41. The
minutes state, "The Court could not appoint counsel on the first day of trial because it
found the application was not timely filed. At this time, because the defendant] is
incarcerated, the Court finds he qualifies for the public defender...." R341 (emphasis
added). The court could reasonably have assumed at this point that defendant, who was
incarcerated, could no longer pursue gainful employment and therefore would qualify for
a public defender. In addition, with the judge's assistance, defendant had finally
completed and submitted an affidavit of indigency. See R344-46.
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his right to counsel, urged him to retain counsel, gave him an opportunity to file an
affidavit of indigency, and informed him of the consequences of continued dilatory
conduct. See R3-4, 279-81, 288-89, 302-03, 309-10, 319-20. Thus, this Court must
assume the regularity of the proceedings below. This Court must assume that the trial
court adequately warned defendant of the consequences of his failure to retain counsel or
establish indigency and that his waiver was voluntary.
2.

Knowing and intelligent waiver.
The existing record indicates that the trial court discussed with defendant not only

the need for counsel, but the importance of counsel. As stated, the trial court discussed
these matters in hearings on January 7, 2003, November 18, 2004, December 7, 2004,
January 4, 2005, and January 19, 2005. As also stated, "[A]fter Ms. Margret Taylor's
services were terminated on November 18, 2004, the court ordered defendant to appear
before the court on several occasions and advise the court on his progress in hiring
counsel." R526. The court continued, "Each time the court admonished. . . the
importance of employing counsel but defendant procrastinated the hiring of counsel even
though he was working in the coal mines." Id. (emphasis added).
These statements suggest that the court properly warned defendant of the dangers
and disadvantages of self-representation. In any event, defendant is again "fatally
handicapped" in asserting that the trial court erred. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24,113.
Defendant has not presented a record upon which this Court can review his claim that the
trial court failed to adequately warning him of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation. Defendant has not included in the record transcripts of the hearings in
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which the court "admonished . . . the importance of employing counsel." R523. Thus,
this Court must assume the regularity of the proceedings below. This Court must assume
that the trial court adequately warned defendant of the consequences of dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation and that his waiver was knowing and intelligent.
II.
DEFENDANT HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT PRETRIAL
COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT PURSUING A MOTION
TO SUPPRESS OR THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN DENYING HIS MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
BASED ON HIS INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIM
"An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal,
presents a question of law." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, f 6, 89 P.3d 162. On the other
hand, where the claim is first raised in a motion for a new trial, this court reviews the trial
court's decision to deny the motion for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Bisner, 2001
UT 99,1 31, 37 P.3d 1073 (citation omitted). This Court "assume[s] that the trial court
exercised proper discretion unless the record clearly shows the contrary." State v.
Hoffhine, 2001 UT 4, \ 25, 20 P.3d 265 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
To establish an ineffective assistance claim, a "defendant must show: (1) that
counsel's performance was objectively deficient, and (2) a reasonable probability exists
that but for the deficient conduct defendant would have obtained a more favorable
outcome." Clark, 2004 UT 25, \ 6 (citing State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah
1996); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). Counsel's failure "to make
motions or objections [that] would be futile if raised does not constitute ineffective
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assistance." State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, \ 34, 989 P.2d 52 (quotations and citations
omitted).
Defendant claims that "[h]ad counsel been effective, [his] alleged confession
would have been suppressed by way of pre-trial motion and hearing." Br. Aplt. at 32.6
Specifically, defendant first claims that the officers who arrested him lacked probable
cause to support the arrest, that his confession was the fruit of an unlawful arrest, and that
his pretrial counsel should have raised this matter in a motion to suppress. Br. Aplt. at
20, 23-24. He claims this basis for his ineffective assistance claim for the first time on
appeal. He must therefore show as a matter of law that counsel's performance was
deficient and he was prejudiced.
Defendant next claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to
suppress his confession on the basis that police interrogated him after he invoked the
right to counsel. Br. Aplt. at 25. While defendant concedes that that he agreed to talk to
officers after they gave him his Miranda warnings, he claims that sometime during the
interrogation he invoked his right to counsel. Id. at 24-25. Defendant originally made
this claim in his motion for a new trial, and the trial court denied it. R417-18, 523-54.

6

Defendant also asserts that pretrial counsel was ineffective for "waiv[ing] his
preliminary hearing." Br. Aplt. at 31. He apparently claims that, had she not waived the
preliminary hearing, his charges would have been limited to one second degree felony,
and crime laboratory expert Jennifer McNair would not have been permitted to testify
concerning the toxicology report prepared by Kevin Smith. Br. Aplt. at 30-31.
Defendant does not develop these claims. He does not explain why counsel's
performance was deficient nor why it was prejudicial. The State therefore does not
address them.
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He must therefore show that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his
motion for a new trial based on this claim.
Because pretrial counsel abandoned the motion to suppress, the court conducted
no suppression hearing. The facts regarding the arrest and the interrogation are therefore
taken from the pleadings files and from the trial transcripts. They show that defendant's
arrest was supported by probable cause. They also show that he did not invoke the right
to counsel during the police interrogation.
A.

The arrest was supported by probable cause.
An arrest is lawful when it is supported by probable cause. "[PJrobable cause

justifying an arrest" requires "'facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge
that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing,
in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to
commit an offense.'" State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, ^ 27, 57 P.3d 1052 (quoting Michigan
v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979)). The determination of whether a law enforcement
officer has probable cause to arrest someone without a warrant "should be made on an
objective standard: whether from the facts known to the officer, and the inferences [that
can] fairly . . . be drawn therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person in [the officer's]
position would be justified in believing that the suspect had committed the offense."
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
7

If this "record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies
resulting therefrom simply [should] be construed in favor of a finding that counsel
performed effectively." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 17, 12 P.3d 92. Defendant
has the burden to provide an adequate record on appeal. See id.
22

Id.

Deputy Greg Funk testified at trial that Colleen Davis, an employee of the Emery
Animal Health Clinic, called him in December 2002 to report that defendant had been
purchasing crystal iodine "on quite a regular basis in . . . pound quantities." R543:63.
Deputy Funk told Ms. Davis to contact him before selling any additional iodine to
defendant. Id. On December 26, 2002, Ms. Davis called Deputy Funk to report that
defendant had placed another order for iodine. Id. When defendant arrived at the clinic,
Ms. Davis again called Detective Funk. Id.
Detective Funk drove to the clinic and entered just as the transaction was being
completed. R543:64-65. He saw defendant receiving money, apparently change, but did
not see the bottle of iodine. R543:65. Defendant left the clinic, and Detective Funk
re-entered and confirmed with Ms. Davis that defendant had just purchased iodine. Id.
Detective Funk then called dispatch, and dispatch called Sergeant Gayle Jensen and told
him to stop defendant's vehicle. Id.
Sergeant Jensen arrived at the Emery Animal Health Clinic just as defendant was
pulling out. R543:77. As he followed defendant, he ran a check on the truck's license
plates. Id, The check revealed that the registration had been revoked. Id, Moreover, he
had knowledge of defendant's iodine purchases. Id. Sergeant Jensen therefore stopped
defendant for two purposes: one, for driving a vehicle with a revoked registration, and,
two, for purchasing a large quantity of iodine for use in the manufacture of
methamphetamine. See id.
Sergeant Jensen advised defendant that he was stopping him for a revoked
registration violation. R543:78. Noting a gun in the pocket of the driver's seat, Sergeant
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Jensen had defendant "come away from that" by exiting the vehicle.

R543:79. About

that time, Detective Funk arrived and began conversing with defendant. R543:66, 79.
Sergeant Jensen "proceeded to do an inventory search of the vehicle, incident to the
revoked registration, which [he was] required to impound" on the revoked registration
violation. R543:79. During that search, he located the bottle of iodine. Id.
Meanwhile, Detective Funk learned from defendant that he worked for a trucking
company and claimed to be a farrier. R543:67. Detective Funk asked defendant "if he
was shoeing any horses right now," and defendant said that he was not. Id. Detective
Funk asked defendant "if this was a slow time of the year," and defendant said that it
was. Id. At that point, Sergeant Jensen came back with the bottle of iodine. Id.
Detective Funk then told defendant that he had received information that defendant was
obtaining iodine for use in methamphetamine manufacture. Id. When defendant did not
respond to that statement, Detective Funk arrested him. Id.
Defendant now claims that his arrest was illegal. It was not. Detective Funk had
reasonable cause to believe, based on the large quantity of crystal iodine in the bottle and
on the information the officers possessed regarding defendant's numerous purchases of
similar large quantities during the two years preceding this incident, that defendant
possessed the crystal iodine with the intent that it be used in the manufacture of
methamphetamine. Thus, he had probable cause to believe that defendant had committed
and was committing a crime.
Moreover, Detective Funk and Sergeant Jensen also had probable cause to believe
that defendant had driven a vehicle with a revoked registration. Driving a vehicle that is
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not properly registered is a class C misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann. § 41-1 a-1303. An
officer may make a warrantless arrest "'for any public offense committed or attempted in
the presence of the officer.55' State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, % 29, 57 P.3d 1052 (quoting
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2(1)). "The term 'public offense5 under section 77-7-2(1)
generally includes misdemeanors.55 Id. Accordingly, an officer who has probable cause
to believe that an individual is driving an unregistered vehicle in his presence may arrest
that individual.
The record evidence supports a determination that the police officers had probable
cause to arrest defendant both for violating the Controlled Substance Precursor Act and
for driving an unregistered vehicle. Thus, it would have been futile for counsel to argue
in a motion to suppress that defendant's confession should have been excluded because
he was unlawfully arrested. Counsel is not ineffective for not making or pursuing futile
claims.8 See Whittle, 1999 UT 96, \ 34.
B.

Defendant, who received his Miranda warnings before agreeing to speak with
police officers, did not later invoke the right to counsel.
Defendant's claim that he invoked his right to counsel during the police

interrogation is frivolous. Defendant originally raised this claim in his motion for a new
trial, arguing then, as he does now, that pretrial counsel should have moved to suppress

Even had defendant's arrest been unlawful, that, of itself, would not have made
his confession excludable. The confession would be excludable only if it was "obtained
by police exploitation of a prior illegality.55 State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, \ 62, 63 P.3d
650 (addressing consent to search). One factor to be considered is intervening
circumstances between the illegality and the confession. "Intervening circumstances may
include such events as an officer telling a person he or she has the right to refuse consent
[to be interrogated] or to consult with an attorney.55 Id. at \ 68.
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his confession on this basis. R416-17. The trial court denied defendant's motion.
R522-27. Making a substantially identical claim now, defendant argues that he
misunderstood his right to counsel, believing that when he asked to speak with the deputy
county attorney during his interrogation that he was invoking the right to counsel. See
Br. Aplt. at 24-25. He claims that the officers violated his Sixth Amendment rights by
"not clarifying that Mr. Langston did not count for purposes of Miranda." Id. at 29.
Because defendant originally raised this basis for an ineffective assistance claim in
his motion for a new trial, he can prevail on the claim only if he can show that the trial
court abused its discretion in denying the motion. Defendant cannot make that showing.
"[A] defendant's request to speak to a prosecutor does not constitute even an equivocal
assertion of the right to counsel. Thus police are free to continue to question a suspect
who has only requested to speak to a prosecuting attorney." State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930,
934 (Utah 1998).
Defendant asked to speak to the prosecutor to determine whether it was in his
interest to confess and cooperate. See R523-24 (findings); see also R484-97 (transcript
of interrogation interview). The trial court properly found that defendant did "not
request[] to talk to counsel," but instead "requested] to talk to Brent Langston, the
Deputy Emery County Attorney, whom defendant believed would be able to enlighten
him as to any deals the prosecutor's office might be willing to make." R523. The trial
court properly concluded that "[b]ecause the defendant waived his right to counsel at the
outset of the interrogation and did not make a later equivocal request for counsel, Margret
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Taylor . . . did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by not filing a motion to
suppress the confession made to the officers." R524.
In sum, defendant has not established the existence of any basis to support a
motion to suppress. As a consequence, he has not shown that counsel was deficient for
not pursuing a motion to suppress. Neither has he shown that he was prejudiced.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 58. Occupations and Professions
K
M Chapter 37C. Utah Controlled Substance Precursor Act
-•§

58~37c-3. Definitions

In addition to the definitions in Section 58-1-102, as used in this chapter:
(1) "Board" means
Section 58-37c-4.

the

Controlled

Substance

Precursor Advisory

Board

created

in

(2) "Controlled substance precursor" includes a chemical reagent and means any of
the following:
(a

Phenyl-2-propanone;

(b

Methylamine;

(c

Ethylamine;

(d

D-lysergic acid;

(e

Ergotamine and its salts;

(f

Diethyl malonate;

(g

Malonic acid;

(h

Ethyl malonate;

(i

Barbituric acid;

(J

Piperidine and its salts;

(k

N-acetylanthranilic acid and its salts;

(1

Pyrrolidine;

(m

Phenylacetic acid and its salts;

(n

Anthranilic acid and its salts;

(o

Morpholine;

(P

Ephedrine;

(q

Pseudoephedrine;

(r

Norpseudoephedrine;

(s

Phenylpropanolamine;

©
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(t) Benzyl cyanide;
(u) Ergonovine and its salts;
(v) 3,4-Methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone;
(w) propionic anhydride;
(x) Insosafrole;
(y) Safrole;
(z) Piperonal;
(aa) N-Methylephedrine;
(bb) N-ethylephedrine;
(cc) N-methylpseudoephedrine;
(dd) N-ethylpseudoephedrine;
(ee) Hydriotic acid;
(ff) gamma butyrolactone
(GBL), including butyrolactone,
oxanolone,
tetrahydro-2-furanone,
dihydro-2(3H)-furanone,
glycol, but not including gamma aminobutric acid (GABA);

1,2
and

butanolide, 2tetramethylene

(gg) 1,4 butanediol;
(hh) any salt, isomer, or salt of an isomer of the chemicals listed in Subsections
(2)(a) through (gg);
(ii) Crystal iodine;
(jj) Iodine at concentrations greater than 1.5% by weight in a solution or matrix;
(kk) Red phosphorous, except as provided in Section 58-37c-19.7;
(11) anhydrous ammonia, except as provided in Section 58-37c-19.9;
(mm) any controlled substance precursor listed under the provisions of the Federal
Controlled Substances Act
[FN1] which is designated by the director under the
emergency^listing provisions set forth in Section 58-37c-14; and
(nn) any chemical which is designated by the director under the emergency listing
provisions set forth in Section 58-37c-14.
(3) "Deliver," "delivery," "transfer," or "furnish" means the actual, constructive,
or attempted transfer of a controlled substance precursor.
(4) "Matrix" means something, as a substance, in which something else originates,
develops, or is contained.
(5)
"Person" means
any
individual,
group
of
individuals, proprietorship,
partnership, joint venture, corporation, or organization of any type or kind.

©
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(6) "Practitioner" means a physician, dentist, podiatric physician, veterinarian,
pharmacist,
scientific
investigator,
pharmacy,
hospital,
pharmaceutical
manufacturer, or other person licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted to
distribute, dispense, conduct research with respect to, administer, or use in
teaching, or chemical analysis a controlled substance in the course of professional
practice or research in this state.

(7) (a) "Regulated distributor" means a person within the state who provides, sells,
furnishes, transfers, or otherwise supplies a listed controlled substance precursor
chemical in a regulated transaction.
(b) "Regulated distributor" does not include any person excluded from regulation
under this chapter.
(8) (a) "Regulated purchaser" means any person within the state who receives
listed controlled substance precursor chemical in a regulated transaction.

a

(b) "Regulated purchaser" does not include any person excluded from regulation
under this chapter.
(9) "Regulated transaction" means any actual, constructive or attempted:
(a) transfer, distribution, delivery, or furnishing by a person within the state
to another person within or outside of the state of a threshold amount of a listed
precursor chemical; or
(b) purchase or acquisition by any means by a person within the state from another
person within or outside the state of a threshold amount of a listed precursor
chemical.

(10) "Retail distributor" means a grocery store, general merchandise store, drug
store, or other entity or person whose activities as a distributor are limited
almost exclusively to sales for personal use:
(a) in both number of sales and volume of sales; and
(b) either directly to walk-in customers or in face-to-face transactions by direct
sales.
(11) "Threshold amount of a listed precursor chemical" means any amount of a
controlled substance precursor or a specified amount of a controlled substance
precursor in a matrix; however, the division may exempt from the provisions of this
chapter a specific controlled substance precursor in a specific amount and in
certain types of transactions which provisions for exemption shall be defined by
the division by rule adopted pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 4 6a, Utah Administrative
Rulemaking Act.
(12) "Unlawful
intentionally:

conduct"

as

defined

in

Section

58-1-501

includes

knowingly

and

(a) engaging in a regulated transaction without first being appropriately licensed
or exempted from licensure under this chapter;
(b) acting as a regulated
way conveying a controlled
not appropriately licensed
selling, transferring, or
©

distributor and selling, transferring, or in any other
substance precursor to a person within the state who is
or exempted from licensure as a regulated purchaser, or
otherwise conveying a controlled substance precursor to
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a person outside of the state and failing to report the transaction as required;
(c) acting as a regulated purchaser and purchasing or in any other way obtaining a
controlled substance precursor from a person within the state who is not a
licensed regulated distributor, or purchasing or otherwise obtaining a controlled
substance precursor from a person outside of the state and failing to report the
transaction as required;

(d) engaging in a regulated transaction and failing to submit reports and keep
required records of inventories required under the provisions of this chapter or
rules adopted pursuant to this chapter;
(e) making any false statement in any application for license, in any record to be
kept, or on any report submitted as required under this chapter;
(f) with the intent of causing the evasion of the recordkeeping or reporting
requirements of this chapter and rules related to this chapter, receiving or
distributing any listed controlled substance precursor chemical in any manner
designed so that the making of records or filing of reports required under this
chapter is not required;
(g) failing to take immediate steps to comply with licensure, reporting, or
recordkeeping requirements of this chapter because of lack of knowledge of those
requirements, upon becoming informed of the requirements;
(h) presenting false or fraudulent identification where or when
purchasing a listed controlled substance precursor chemical;

receiving

or

(i) creating a chemical mixture for the purpose of evading any licensure,
reporting or recordkeeping requirement of this chapter or rules related to this
chapter, or receiving a chemical mixture created for that purpose;
(j) if the person is at least 18 years of age, employing, hiring, using,
persuading, inducing, enticing, or coercing another person under 18 years of age
to violate any provision of this chapter, or assisting in avoiding detection or
apprehension for any violation of this chapter by any federal, state, or local law
enforcement official; and
(k) obtaining or attempting to obtain or to possess any controlled substance
precursor or any combination of controlled substance precursors knowing or having
a reasonable cause to believe that the controlled substance precursor is intended
to be used in the unlawful manufacture of any controlled substance.
(13) "Unprofessional conduct" as defined in Section 58-1-102 and as may be further
defined by rule includes the following:
(a) violation of any provision of this chapter, the Controlled Substance Act
[FN2] of this state or any other state, or the Federal Controlled Substance Act;
and
(b) refusing to allow agents or representatives of the division or authorized law
enforcement personnel to inspect inventories or controlled substance precursors or
records or reports relating to purchases and sales or distribution of controlled
substance precursors as such records and reports are required under this chapter.
Laws 1992, c. 155, §
3; Laws 1993, c. 297, §
183; Laws 1996, c. 232, § 11,
eff. July 1, 1996; Laws 1998, c. 100, § 1, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 2000, c. 271,
©
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UT ST § 58-37c-3
U.C.A. 1953 § 58-37c-3
§

3, eff. May 1, 2000;
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Laws 2000, c. 272, §

[FN1]

See 21 U.S.C.A. §

[FN2]

Section 58-37-1 et seq.

1, eff. May 1, 2000.

801 et seq.

CROSS REFERENCES
Definitions relevant to this chapter, see §

58-37-2.

Exemption from licensure under Title 58, see §

©

58-1-307.
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Addendum B

7th DIST. COURT - CASTLE DALE COURT
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
INITIAL APPEARANCE
NOTICE

VS.

Case No: 031700004 FS

JEFFERY (NMI) HOUSTON,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

BRYCE K. BRYNER
January 7, 2003

PRESENT
Clerk:
julieqw
Prosecutor: LANGSTON, W. BRENT
Defendant
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: June 29, 1968
Audio
Tape Number:
0803-1
Tape Count: 1087
CHARGES
1. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony
INITIAL APPEARANCE
A copy of the Information is given to the defendant.
The Information is read.
Advised of charges and penalties.
The defendant is advised of right to counsel.
The def indicated he would hire his own counsel.
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Case No: 031700004
Date:
Jan 07, 2 003
PRELIMINARY HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 02/04/2003
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Location: Courtroom A
EMERY CO. COURT HOUSE
95 EAST MAIN
CASTLE DALE, UT 84513
Before Judge: BRYCE K. BRYNER
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7th DIST. COURT - CASTLE DALE COURT
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
NOTICE

vs.

Case No: 031700004 FS

JEFFERY (NMI) HOUSTON,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

BRYCE K. BRYNER
November 18, 2 004

PRESENT
Clerk:
julieqw
Prosecutor: LANGSTON, W. BRENT
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): TAYLOR, MARGRET SIDWELL
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: June 29, 1968
Audio
Tape Number:
CD-2 0
Tape Count: 9:47
CHARGES
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty

ACT

2nd Degree Felony

ACT

2nd Degree Felony

ACT

2nd Degree Felony

ACT

2nd Degree Felony

ACT

2nd Degree Felony

ACT

2nd Degree Felony

ACT

2nd Degree Felony

ACT

2nd Degree Felony

ACT

2nd Degree Felony
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Case No: 031700004
Date:
Nov 18, 2004
10. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty
11. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty
12. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty
13. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty
14. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty
15. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty
16. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty
17. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty

ACT - 2nd Degree Felony
ACT - 2nd Degree Felony
ACT - 2nd Degree Felony
ACT - 2nd Degree Felony
ACT - 2nd Degree Felony
ACT - 2nd Degree Felony
ACT - 2nd Degree Felony
ACT - 2nd Degree Felony

HEARING
This was the date and hour set for Jury Trial in this matter.
Counsel contacted the court yesterday afternoon and indicated they
had reached a plea agreement.
The Court inquired of def counsel and the def if that was their
intent. Each of them addressed the Court.
The Court finds the def is not prepared to enter a plea at this
time. Ms. Taylor made a Motion to Withdraw from the case.
The Court finds that there appears to be a conflict between the
def and his counsel and will allow Ms. Taylor to withdraw from the
case.
The Court sets this matter for Jury Trial beginning January 26,
2005, at 9:00 a.m. and sets it for two days. The def is to appear
back before this court on December 7, 2004, at 1:30 p.m. together
with his new counsel.
JURY TRIAL is scheduled.
Date: 01/26/2005
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: Courtroom A
EMERY CO. COURT HOUSE
1850 North 560 West
CASTLE DALE, UT 84 513
Before Judge: BRYCE K. BRYNER
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Case No: 031700004
Date:
Nov 18, 2 004
JURY TRIAL.
Date: 01/27/2005
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: Courtroom A
EMERY CO. COURT HOUSE
1850 North 560 West
CASTLE DALE, UT 84513
Before Judge: BRYCE K. BRYNER
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
Date: 12/07/2004
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Location: Courtroom A
EMERY CO. COURT HOUSE
1850 North 560 West
CASTLE DALE, UT 84513
Before Judge: BRYCE K. BRYNER
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7th DIST. COURT - CASTLE DALE COURT
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

VS.

Case No: 031700004 FS

JEFFERY (NMI) HOUSTON,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

BRYCE K. BRYNER
December 7, 2004

PRESENT
Clerk:
julieqw
Prosecutor: LANGSTON, W. BRENT
Defendant
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: June 29, 1968
Audio
Tape Number:
CD-21
Tape Count: 2:04
CHARGES
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
10 . VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT
Plea: Not Guilty

2nd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
- 2nd Degree Felony

288
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Case Mo: 031700004
Date:
Dec 07, 2004
11. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty
12. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty
13. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty
14. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty
15. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty
16. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty
17. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty

ACT - 2nd Degree Felony
ACT - 2nd Degree Felony
ACT - 2nd Degree Felony
ACT - 2nd Degree Felony
ACT - 2nd Degree Felony
ACT - 2nd Degree Felony
ACT - 2nd Degree Felony

HEARING
The Court finds that the def has employed Attorney, Bruce Oliver.
The Court confirms the trial set for January 2 6 and 27, 2 005, and
further sets a Pre-Trial on Jan. 4, 2005, at 9:00 a.m.
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled.
Date: 01/04/2005
Time: 09:45 a.m.
Location: Courtroom A
EMERY CO. COURT HOUSE
1850 North 560 West
CASTLE DALE, UT 84 513
Before Judge: BRYCE K. BRYNER
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7th DIST. COURT - CASTLE DALE COURT
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
LAW AND MOTION

vs,

Case No: 031700004 FS

JEFFERY (NMI) HOUSTON,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

BRUCE K. HALLIDAY
December 21, 2004

PRESENT
Clerk:
julieqw
Prosecutor: BLACKWELL, DAVID A
Defendant not present
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: June 29, 1968
Audio
Tape Number:
CD-21
Tape Count: 9:17
CHARGES
1. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
2. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT •
Plea: Not Guilty
3. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
4. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
5. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
6. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
7. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
8. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
9. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
10. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT

2nd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
- 2nd Degree Felony
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Case No: 031700004
Date:
Dec 21, 2004
Plea: Not Guilty
11. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty
12. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty
13. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty
14. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty
15. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty
16. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty
17. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty

ACT

2nd Degree Felony

ACT

2nd Degree Felony

ACT

2nd Degree Felony

ACT

2nd Degree Felony

ACT

2nd Degree Felony

ACT

2nd Degree Felony

ACT

2nd Degree Felony

HEARING
This matter was placed on the calendar because of def counsel's
motion to withdraw, however, the def was unable to be found to
receive service of the notice of today's hearing.
The Court confirmed the January 4, 2005, pre-trial.
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7th DIST. COURT - CASTLE DALE COURT
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE

vs.

Case No: 031700004 FS

JEFFERY (NMI) HOUSTON,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

BRYCE K. BRYNER
January 4, 2 0 05

PRESENT
Clerk:
wendid
Prosecutor: LANGSTON, WILLIAM B
Defendant
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: June 29, 1968
Audio
Tape Number:
CD-21
Tape Count: 9:48 50
CHARGES
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
10 . VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT
Plea: Not Guilty

2nd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
- 2nd Degree Felony
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Case Mo: 031700004
Date:
Jan 04, 2005
11. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty
12. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty
13. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty
14. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty
15. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty
16. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty
17. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty

ACT

2nd Degree Felony

ACT

2nd Degree Felony

ACT

2nd Degree Felony

ACT

2nd Degree Felony

ACT

2nd Degree Felony

ACT

2nd Degree Felony

ACT

2nd Degree Felony

HEARING
The defendant advised the Court that his attorney has withdrawn.
The Court questioned the defendant and based upon his answers and
the Motion that his attorney filed, found that his attorney had
withdrawn because the defendant failed to keep in touch
with him.
The defendant is employed full time and does not qualify for a
public defender.
The Court denied the defendant's request for a continuance and
confirms the trial date of January 26 and 27, 2005 at 9:00 a.m.
The Court urged the defendant to do whatever it takes to secure
counsel for himself.
Dated this

day of

20

BRYCE K. BRYNER
District Court Judge
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7th DIST. COURT - CASTLE DALE COURT
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
REPORT ON ATTORNEY STATUS

vs.

Case No: 031700004 FS

JEFFERY (NMI) HOUSTON,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

BRYCE K. BRYNER
January 19, 2 005

PRESENT
Clerk:
julieqw
Prosecutor: LANGSTON, WILLIAM B
Defendant
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: June 29, 1968
Audio
Tape Number:
CD-22
Tape Count: 9:16
CHARGES
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
10 . VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT
Plea: Not Guilty

2nd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
- 2nd Degree Felony
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Case No: 031700004
Date:
Jan 19, 2005
11. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty
12. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty
13. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty
14. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty
15. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty
16. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty
17. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR
Plea: Not Guilty

ACT

2nd Degree Felony

ACT

2nd Degree Felony

ACT

2nd Degree Felony

ACT

2nd Degree Felony

ACT

2nd Degree Felony

ACT

2nd Degree Felony

ACT

2nd Degree Felony

HEARING
The def informed the Court that he has not hired counsel. The def
was informed that the Jury Trial will go forward as set to begin on
January 26 & 27, 2005. The Court finds that the def has had ample
time to hire counsel.
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7th DIST. COURT - CASTLE DALE COURT
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

MINUTES
JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No: 031700004 FS

JEFFERY (NMI) HOUSTON,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

BRYCE K. BRYNER
January 26, 2 005

PRESENT
Clerk:
juliegw
Prosecutor: LANGSTON, WILLIAM B
Defendant
Defendant pro se
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: June 29, 1968
Audio
Tape Number:
CD-23
Tape Count: 9:27
CHARGES
1. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
2. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
3. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
4. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
5. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
6. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
7. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
8. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
9. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT Plea: Not Guilty
10. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT

2nd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
2nd Degree Felony
- 2nd Degree Felony
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Case No: 031700004
Date:
Jan 26, 2005
Plea: Not Guilty
11. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty
12. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty
13. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty
TRIAL
TAPE: CD-23
COUNT: 9:27
Court opened without the jury present.
COUNT: 9:28
The Court addressed the def ' s Affidavit of Indigency which was
faxed to the Court on 1-24-05 at 11:30 p.m. The Court finds that
the application is incomplete and untimely and the Court will not
consider the Affidavit.
COUNT: 9:31
The Court then reviewed with those present the timeline of the
case since it was filed with the Court.
COUNT: 9:37
The Court finds the def had ample time to hire private counsel or
apply for court-appointed counsel, but has failed to do so. The
Court finds it has no other option at this time than to go forward
with the trial today.
COUNT: 9:38
The Court inquired of the State the difference between the Amended
Information and the Second Amended Information. The State
addressed the Court's question. The def had no objection to the
Second Amended Information.
COUNT: 9:40
The Court orders the Second Amended Information filed. The Court
explained the jury selection process to the def and his right to
testify and present evidence and witnesses.
COUNT: 9:45
The def requested a continuance to allow him time to get his
witnesses. The State objected. The Court denied the motion for
continuance.
COUNT: 9:49
The jury was brought into the Courtroom. The Court welcomed the
jurors and briefly explained the jury selection process. The
jurors were given the Oath on Voir Dire.
COUNT: 9:54
Page 2
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Case No: 031700004
Date:
Jan 26, 2005
The Clerk read the names of 16 jurors randomly drawn by the
computer. The Court explained the nature of the charges to the
prospective jurors. The Court then questioned the jurors regarding
their competency to serve as trial jurors.
The following jurors were excused for cause: Howard Dale
VanWagoner, Kent Stilson, Morris Blackburn, Tyler Wilstead, Larene
Ivie, Youlonda James, Casey Vuksinick, Eric Pedersen, Wendi
Downard.
The clerk called additional names to replace those excused to
total 16 prospective jurors. The State and Mr. Houston then
exercised their pre-emptory challenges.
COUNT: 11:58
The Clerk read the names of the 8 jurors selected to try the case
as follows: Anna Emery, Jack Fielder, Wayne Roberts, Melanie
Thompson, Daisy Van Wagoner, Denise Childs, Annette Reid, Clifton
Carter. The jurors were given the Oath to Try to Case.
The Court excused the jurors not selected.
COUNT: 12:00
The Court admonished the jury as to proper conduct and excused the
jury.
COUNT: 12:02
The Court was in session outside the jury. On request of the
State, the Court inquired of the def his physical status because
the State had been made aware that the def worked graveyard shift
last night.
COUNT: 12:03
The def requested a continuance until tomorrow. The State
objected. The Court denied the motion.
COUNT: 12:07
The Court recessed for lunch.
COUNT: 1:35
Court reconvened with all parties and the jury present.
COUNT: 1:36
The Clerk read the information and the jurors were informed that
the def had entered pleas of Not Guilty to all charges.
COUNT: 1:46
The State presented opening statements.
COUNT: 1:56
Mr. Houston presented opening statements.
COUNT: 1:59
State's witness, Jennifer McNair, State Crime Lab Ciminalist, was
sworn and testifed.
COUNT: 2:06
Page 3
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Case No: 031700004
Date:
Jan 26, 2005
State's witness, Colleen Davis, Emery Animal Health, was sworn and
testified.
COUNT: 2:14
State's exhibit #1, was offered. Mr. Houston objected. The State
layed more foundation.
COUNT: 2:16
The State re-offered ex #1. The Court overruled the def's
objection and received ex #1.
COUNT: 2:21
State's witness, Deputy Greg Funk, Emery County Sheriff's office,
was sworn and testified.
COUNT: 2:30
State's exhibit #2, was offered and received.
COUNT: 2:40
State's witness, Sgt. Gayle Jensen, was sworn and testified.
COUNT: 2:46
State's witness Leonard (Butch) Rogers, Farrier, was sworn and
testified.
COUNT: 2:58
State's witness, Sgt. Tom Harrison, Emery Co. Sheriff's Office,
was sworn and testified.
COUNT: 3:15
The Court admonished the jury as to proper conduct and excused
them from the courtroom. The Court took its afternoon break.
COUNT: 3:33
Court reconvened with all parties and the jury present.
COUNT: 3:34
State's witness, Tom Harrison, resumed testimony.
COUNT: 3:46
State's witness, Glen Jensen, Emery Animal Health, was sworn and
testified.
COUNT: 4:02
The State requested that Exhibit #1 be published to the Jury. The
Court granted the request.
COUNT: 4:09
Court admomished the jury and excused them from the courtroom.
Court then recessed for the day.

Page 4 (last)

334

7th DIST. COURT - CASTLE DALE COURT
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
JURY TRIAL

vs.

Case No: 031700004 FS

JEFFERY (NMI) HOUSTON,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

BRYCE K. BRYNER
January 27, 2 0 05

PRESENT
Clerk:
julieqw
Prosecutor: LANGSTON, WILLIAM B
Defendant
Defendant pro se
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: June 29, 1968
Tape Number:
CD-23
Tape Count: 9:07
CHARGES
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT •• 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT •• 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - • 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT •• 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - • 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT •• 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - • 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT •• 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT •• 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty
10 . VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty
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Case No: 031700004
Date:
Jan 27, 2005
11. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty
12. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty
13. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty
TRIAL
COUNT: 9:07
Court reconvened with all parties present outside the jury.
COUNT: 9:08
The Court explained the def' s right to testify and present
evidence. The Court recessed for 15 minutes to allow the def time
to prepare his questions.
COUNT: 9:35
Court reconvened with all parties and jury present.
COUNT: 9:36
Def, Jeffery Houston, was sworn and testified.
COUNT: 9:39
Def ex #3, offered and received.
COUNT: 10:49
The jury was admonished and excused to allow the parties to
discuss matters of law.
COUNT: 10:51
The Court was in session outside the jury. The State requested
that the jury be allowed to listed to the taped interview with the
def and be given a copy of the transcript prepared by Teresa
Manzanares to assist in following along with the tape.
COUNT: 10:53
Mr. Houston objected. The parties argued the matter. The Court
will allow Ms. Manzanares to testify regarding her transcribing
qualifications.
COUNT: 11:00
Court recessed.
COUNT: 11:08
Court reconvened with all parties and jury present.
Def, Jeffery Houston, resumed testimony.
COUNT: 11:17
The defense rested its case.
State's witness, Sgt. Tom Harrison, was recalled.
'COUNT: 11:25
State's witness, Sheriff Lamar Guymon, was sworn and testified.
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Case No: 031700004
Date:
Jan 27, 2005
COUNT: 11:28
The jury was admonished and excused from the courtroom
COUNT: 11:29
The Court was in session outside the jury.
State!s witness, Teresa Manzanares, was sworn and testified.
COUNT: 11:38
The parties argued the admissibility of exhibit #4 and the
transcript.
COUNT: 11:46
Court recessed.
COUNT: 11:54
The Court reconvened outside the jury. The Court grants the
State's request to allow the jurors to view the transcript of the
interview while listening to the tape. The Court finds the person
who prepared the transcript is qualified although she is
not currently a certified court transcriber.
COUNT: 12:00
The Court recessed for lunch.
COUNT: 1:04
Court reconvened with all parties and the jury present.
COUNT: 1:05
State's witness, Colleen Davis, was recalled.
COUNT: 1:14
State's witness, Sgt. Tom Harrison, was recalled.
COUNT: 1:16
The state offered exhibit #4. Mr. Houston voir dired the witness.
COUNT: 1:20
The jury was admonished and excused from the courtroom to discuss
matters of law.
COUNT: 1:21
The Court was in session outside the jury.
Mr. Houston objected to exhibit #4. The parties argued the
admission of exhibit #4.
COUNT: 1:26
Brent Langston, Emery County Attorney, was sworn and testified.
COUNT: 1:34
Mr. Houston argued the admission of exhibit #4.
COUNT: 1:38
State's witness, Greg Funk, was recalled.
COUNT: 1:40
The State re-offered exhibit #4. Mr. Houston objected.
COUNT: 1:41
In this matter, the Court finds it is the burden of the def to
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show that the tape was altered and he has failed to do that. The
objection is overruled. Exhibit #4 is received.
COUNT: 1:42
The jury was returned to the courtroom.
COUNT: 1:43
State's witness, Dr. Glen Jensen, was recalled.
COUNT: 1:54
The State requested the jury be allowed to listed to exhibit #4
and to distribute the transcript to the jury.
The Court granted the motion.
COUNT: 1:56
The Court instructed the jury that the transcript is for the sole
purpose of assisting them in listening to the tape.
COUNT: 1:59
The tape (exhibit #4) was then played for the jury.
COUNT: 2:50
The Court admonished the jury and excused them from the courtroom.
The Court then took a brief recess.
COUNT: 3:06
Court reconvened with all parties and the jury present. Exhibit
#4, audio tape, continued to play for the jury.
COUNT: 3:46
Exhibit #4, audio tape, was concluded.
The State rested its case.
The def was informed of his right to present sur-rebuttal
testimony.
COUNT: 3:47
The defendant was recalled.
COUNT: 3:58
The defendant rested his case.
The Court finds both sides have concluded their case and rested.
COUNT: 3:59
The jury was admonished and excused from the courtroom.
COUNT: 4:00
The Court was in session outside the jury. The State and
defendant were given copies of the proposed jury instructions and
verdict. The Court requested the parties to review those tonight
and it will take exceptions to them tomorrow morning.
COUNT: 4:01
Court adjourned for the day, to be continued at 8:45 tomorrow
morning.
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7th DIST. COURT - CASTLE DALE COURT
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
JURY TRIAL

vs.

Case No: 031700004 FS

JEFFERY (NMI) HOUSTON,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

BRYCE K. BRYNER
January 28, 2 005

PRESENT
Clerk:
julieqw
Prosecutor: LANGSTON, WILLIAM B
Defendant
Defendant pro se
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: June 29, 1968
Audio
Tape Number:
CD-23
Tape Count: 8:52
CHARGES
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/28/2005 Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/28/2005 Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/28/2005 Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/28/2005 Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/28/2005 Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/28/2005 Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/28/2005 Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/28/2005 Guilty
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/28/2005 Guilty
.
VIOLATION
OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony
10
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Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/28/2005 Guilty
11. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/28/2005 Guilty
12. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/28/2005 Guilty
13. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/28/2005 Guilty
TRIAL
COUNT: 8:52
The reconvened with all parties present outside the jury.
COUNT: 8:54
The Court inquired if counsel and the def have any exceptions or
objections to the proposed jury instructions or the verdict form.
COUNT: 8:55
The State informed the Court that they have no exceptions or
objections to the jury instructions nor the verdict form.
The def informed the Court that he has no exceptions or objections
to the jury instructions nor the verdict form.
COUNT: 8:57
The Court reviewed with the def the procedure for the remainder of
the trial.
COUNT: 8:59
Court recessed.
COUNT: 9:08
Court reconvened with all parties and the jury present.
COUNT: 9:09
The Court read the jury instructions to the jury.
COUNT: 9:33
The State presented closing arguments.
COUNT: 10:25
The Court instructed the jury as to selecting a foreperson.
The bailiff was sworn and the jury was excused from the courtroom
to begin deliberations.
COUNT: 11:22
The Court was informed that the jury had reached a verdict. Court
reconvened with all parties present. The jury was returned to the
courtroom. All jurors were present. The foreperson informed the
Court that the jury had reached a verdict.
The verdict was handed to the Judge.
COUNT: 11:25
The Clerk read the verdict. The def was found GUILTY as to all 13
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counts in the information.
COUNT: 11:26
The jury was poled. The Court found the verdict to be unanimous.
The Court ordered the verdict entered on the record.
COUNT: 11:27
The jury was thanked for their service and excused.
COUNT: 11:29
The Court was in session outside the jury. The Court orders the
defendant to be taken into custody at this time.
The Court could not appoint counsel on the first day of trial
because it found the application was not timely filed. At this
time, because the def is incarcerated, the Court finds he qualifie
for the public defender and appoints David Allred for sentenc
COUNT: 11:31
The Court denied the def ! s request to be released on his own
recognize.
The def is ordered to appear with counsel on February 1, 2005, at
9:00 a.m. at which time this matter will be referred to State
Corrections for a presentence report and a sentencing date set.
The def was remanded to the custody of the Emery County Sheriff.
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
Court finds the defendant indigent and appoints DAVID M ALLRED to
represent the defendant.
Appointed Counsel:
Name:
Address:
City:
Phone:

DAVID M ALLRED
POB 5 75
CASTLE DALE UT 84537
(435)381-5326

Affidavit of indigency has been completed by the defendant
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SET SENTENCING DATE is scheduled.
Date: 02/01/2005
Time: 09:OO a.m.
Location: Courtroom A
EMERY CO. COURT HOUSE
1850 North 560 West
CASTLE DALE, UT 84513
Before Judge: BRYCE K. BRYNER
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D, Bruce Oliver #5120
Attorney for Defendant
180 South 300 "West, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490
Telephone: (801) 328-8888
Fax: (801) 595-0300

MAR 2 4 2005

LiMTHDOTCT COURTS
So*

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 031700004
vs.
JEFFgRY HOUSTON
Judge Bryce K. Bryner
Defendant.

Comes now the defendant, Jeffery Houston, by and through counsel, D. Bruce
Oliver, and hereby moves this Honorable Court for a new trial based upon effectiveness
assistance of counsel causing an unfair trial and violation'of due process. In the alternative,
Defendant seeks reconsideration and an order vacating the March 14, 2005 sentence based
upon newly discovered evidence and prosecutorial immunity for re-sentencing purposes.
Said motion is submitted pursuant to Rule 25, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Said motion is further submitted pursuant to Kule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedures. Finally, said motion is supported by the accompanying memorandum or points
and authorities, which is incorporated herein by this reference.
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Dated this

day of March, 2005.

D. BRUCE OLIVER
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on this 23rd day of March, 2005,1
served a copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL upon the counsel for the
Defendant in this matter, and other presumed interested parties by mailing it to counsel by first
class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following addresses: David A. Blackwell, W.
Brent Langston, P.O. Box 249, Castle, Utah 84513.

J^^v^cr

FILED
D.Bruce Oliver #5120
Attorney for Defendant
180 South 300 West, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490
Telephone: (801) 328-8888
Fax: (801) 595-0300

MAR 2 4 2005
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURTS

IN THE SEVENTH / JDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Case No. 031700004

vs.
JEFFERY HOUSTON
Defendant.

Judge Bryce K. Bryncr

Comes now the defendant, Jeffery Houston, by and through counsel, D. Bruce
Oliver, and hereby submits this memoranda of points and authorities in support of his Uonon
For New Trial
INTRODUCTION.
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, reads;
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant a new trial in
the interest ofjustice if there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse
effect upon therightsof a party*
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The motion shall
be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in support of the motion. If
additional time is required to procure affidavits or evidence the court may postpone the
hearing on the motion for such time as it deems reasonable.
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(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within 10 days after imposition of sentence, or
within such further time as the court mayfixduring the ten-day period.
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no trial had been
held and the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned either in evidence or in argument.
Rule 22, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, reads in pertinent part;
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence* or a sentence imposed in an illegal
manner, at any time,

STATEMENTS OF RELEVANT FACTS.
1.

On December 30, 2002, Defendant was arrested for possessing a pound of

crystal iodine*
2.

A jury trial was conducted in this matter on January 26-28, 2005 before the

Honorable Bryce K. Brynen
3.

The prior Thursday, January 19, 2005, the Court conducted a status conference

with defendant present* During that conference, the court instructed Mr. Houston to fill out an
affidavit of indigency for appointment of counsel consideration. The court's instruction was

to file it iwmedfattty*
4.

By Monday, January 24, 2005, at 11:30 p.m., Defendant faxed in his

application. However> the judge was not presented the application until Tuesday afternoon-the
day before trial.
5.

Thefollowingday, the Court entered findings which included the long sorted

history of the case, and the court conclusion was two-fold: (1) the application was untimely*
and (2) the defendant had been provided two months to obtain counsel,
6.

The history of tbe case included:
i

A.

This action was filed by an original information charging document on

January 6, 2003, The information was one count of possession of a precursor, iodine crystals.
B.

On February 3, 2003, Margret Taylor appeared on the defendant's

behalf, and a prelim was scheduled for April 4, 2003.
C.

That scheduled prelim was not held and subsequently postponed.

D»

On or about December 2, 2003, through counsel, the prelim was waived.

E.

On or about April 4, 2004, a suppression hearing was scheduled.

F.

That hearing was also continued.

D.

A trial was scheduled to convene on November 17, 2004; however, one

day before trial it was canceled because an alleged plea agreement was reached.
E-

That agreement never resulted and a dispute arose between Taylor and

her client. As a result Taylor moved for her withdrawal as counsel. The court permitted the
withdrawal*
F.

Trial was scheduled for trial to convene on January 26, 2005. The

defendant was informed he had to obtain new counsel and appear before the court on
December 7, 2004 at a hearing*
O.

At that December 7, 2004 hearing, the defendant appeared before the

Honorable Bryce K. Bryner and informed the court that he had retained D. Bruce Oliver as his
attorney. This representation was supported by the written appearance of counsel mailed to the
court by Mr. Oliver.
H.

However, on or about December 16, 2004, Mr Oliver motioned for the

withdrawal as counsel due to loss of contact with the defendant. The court permitted that
3

withdrawal
I.

On January 13, 2005, the court ordered Mr. Houston to appear to

discuss options,
7.

A first amended information was filed on or about May 5, 2003 alleging 16

additional counts for a total of 17 counts covering alleged criminal conduct from June 29, 1999
to December 30, 2002*
8.

On the first day of trial, Thursday, January 26, 2005, the court conducted a jury

trial But first before trial, the court declined to appoint counsel for Mr. Houston, requiring
him to proceed pro se, or without counsel
9.

Following that decision, the State filed a second amended information charging

document reducing the number of counts to 13.
10.

The counts were each possession of a controlled substance precursor (crystal

iodine) with knowledge that it would be intended to be used in the manufacturer of
methamphetamine. All counts were second decree felonies.
11.

The basis for these charges is Houston's alleged purchase history printout from

the Emery Animal Health coupled with alleged admissions taken from Houston during his
three hour interrogation by Detective Gregory Funk, Sgt. Gayle Jensen, Sgt. Tom Harrison,
and Deputy Emery County Attorney W. Brent Langston.
12.

During that interrogation, the defendant maintained for an hour the crystal

iodine was lawfully purchased at the animal clinic, that he was a farrier, and he used the
crystal iodine as a farrier while shoeing horses*
13.

Crystal iodine is used as an antiseptic. It is used by farrier while shoeing to
4

combat bacteria and ftmgal conditions, such as thrush.
14.

During the interrogation, the defendant indicated that in the puai he ha* had

crystal iodine stolen from him, he has spilled iodine, and he has used crystal iodine as a
preventative.
15.

It is undisputed that Mr. Houston is a licensed farrier, receiving his education in

Oklahoma at a farrier school in 1995.
16.

The December 30, 2002 interrogation was transcribed. The three hour event

totals 61 pages* A copy is attached; however, the defendants disputes its accuracy.
17.

On page one, the defendant is advised of his Miranda rights.

18.

On page 39, the defendant makes an equivocal request for counsel, stating,

*- With - Why I wanted him here is - is that I kind of - I kind of need to know my position where I sit before I incriminate myself any further.n
19.

That equivocal request never was responded to with termination after

clarification first. Instead, the investigators and Langston all encouraged Houston to cooperate
offering incentives. On page 39, Mr, Langston said, "You make them happy; you make me
happy . . . But Til be honest with you. You're facing serious charges . . A second degree
felony. Okay? - . . Now, I'm not saying - I don't know what will happen What happens to
a large extent depends on you. Yon can tell me to go (inaudible), and that's fine, or we can
work together.n
20.

At trial, Sgt Harrison testified that Mr. Houston was asked to come a 100%

clean. On page 40, Houston states, "Yea> I'm more than interested in - in - Okay, Let's
put it this way: Til come a hundred percent clean
s

21.

On page 42, Mr. Langston responded, *Let me tell you this; I've been a

prosecutor for sixteen years, I've been pretty much . . . (inaudible). I have a reputation of
being fair. If you want to know the specifics of what I can do, I don't know, because I don't
know what you have to offer, so I can't make you a promise - you know, promise you the
minimum without knowing what is there. What I can promise you is that I will be fair with
you. And, uh, you know, the big thing that you need to look at is there is there is a big
distinction between felony and misdemeanor. If I am satisfied that you're coming clean with
me, we can go the route that's not going to make you a convicted felon for the rest of your
life. And, uh. that's up to you. Til be fair with you, and,everything at this point is
negotiable depending upon you. You're the one that this all depends on.
22.

During trial testimony, Sgt Harrison testified that it was investigators desire to

get a lab, he accepted that Mr. Houston could not give them a lab. See also page 43, At trial,
Harrison further testified that as an alternative,^ was their desire "to go up the latter."
23.

On pages 47-48, Langston speaks of drug court as a best case scenario and a 1

to 15 sentence as a worse case scenario,
24.

On page 48, Sgt. Harrison interjects, "Let me go on a limb right here and see if

this will get the ball rolling here, okay? We can't - We don't know what were going to do
on the delivery. Let's just talk about you. Let's no talk about delivery or anything else.
You're charged with a second-degree felony right now, okay? We can recommend thirddegree, probation, no jail time; we can recommend drug court" in exchange for Houston
coining clean.
25.

On page 49, Mr. Houston again expresses his concern about self-incrimination.

In response, both Harrison and Langston sweetened the pot.
26.

Harrison stated, "-it's not going to get any worse for you right now with our

charge of a second-degree felony. It's not going to get any worse than that. That's all
we've got on yourightnow.
27.

Mr. Langston added, "Let me say this: I've got enough evidence to convict

you for a second-degree felony • • • Now, I can also decide not even to file it as a felony if I
think you're coming clean with me. But if you want to play games, that's fine. You don't
have to do anything, You have the right to not say a word. (See pages 49-50).
28.

On page 50, Houston agreed to cooperate.

29.

After an expression of concern for his family's safety, Mr. Langston reassured

Houston, "I'm not going to lie to you**
30.

Following these discussions, Mr. Houston breaks down and confesses his

alleged crime. Moreover, the defendant discussed his role as the purchase man and that he
would deliver the crystal iodine to John Paul Fazio.
31.

Subsequently, John Paul Pazzio, was picked up and arrested for Driving with

Measurable Controlled Substance, Possession of a Controlled Substance, and Possession of
Clandestine Lab Equipment in Carbon County.
32.

Mr. Fazzio was subsequently charged with said offenses in the Seventh District

Court in Price, Utah under case no, 031403751 and he was convicted and placed on probation.
ARGUMENT.
POINT L DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS - EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
In this matter, the defendant asserts that he was denied effective assistance of
7

counsel This ineffective is alleged to have resulted in an unfair jury trial. Had he received
effective assistance of counsel, (1) Defendant would have had his equivocal request for counsel
and to remain silem during interrogation suppressed as evidence during the trial; (2) Defendant
would have had the charge limited to one saumd degree felony, at worse, at the time of trial or
plead guilty to misdemeanor charges, at best. In the alternative, at trial, the defendant would
have the benefit of reduced offenses or lesser included offenses presented to the jury at the
time of trial.
As case law in support of his effective assistance of counsel claim, Defendant
directs this Court's attention to State v. Maestas . 984 P,2d 376 (Utah 1999). In this case, the
Maestas was granted a new trial on the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for the simple
fact that counsel did not ensure a Long instruction was included in that matter, because a
witness's memory is fallible. In this matter, defense counsel is not certain whether a Long
instruction was included at the time of trial. The only instructions he has in the file is the
elements and the "controlled substance precursor" instruction.
Notwithstanding, more prejudicial error occurred in this matter than what
occurred in Maestas. In this matter, as demonstrated in the interrogation transcript, Mr.
Houston was clearly enticed into alleged confessed criminal conduct. That confession was
relied on heavily at the time of trial. All three investigators, Harrison, Jensen, and Funk all
referred to the confession that "crystal iodine was being traded for cash or meth" to John Paul
Fazzio, That confession was even referenced in the opening remarks by the prosecutor, Brent
Langston who assisted investigators in obtaining the alleged confession upon his promises for
Mr> Houston coming clean. In this matter the defendant came clean, even after to assertions of
9

his rights against self-incriminitkm and for counsel
Had counsel been effective, this alleged confession would have been suppressed
by way of pre-trial motion and hearing. Had counsel bee effective, other errors would not
have occurred. For instance, Defendant's prelim was waived, Had the prelim not been
waived~had it conducted, the court would have concluded under the doctrine of Ejusdem
Generis that and other statutory construction schemes, that as a licensed farrier defendant did
not commit a violation of Section 58-37c-ll, but rather of Section 58-37c-19. Finally, had
defendant been afforded effective assistance of counsel, defendant could have compelled the
State to honor it grant of prosecutorial immunity, which is clearly outlined above.
See the following arguments for specifics.

POINT IL

DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS - EQUIVOCAL REQUEST FOR COUNSEL
AND TO REMAIN SILENT.
In this matter, the defendant claims ineffective assistance of counsel against

Margret Taylor, in part, for her failure to obtain an order of suppression for the equivocal
request for counsel and to remain silent. See transcript pages 39 and 49. In support of these
claims, Defendant draws this Court's attention to State y. Sampson . 808 P,2d 1100 (Utah Ct,
App, 1990), In Sampspfl. the defendant's conviction was reversed and remanded for a new
trial based upon the fact the jury was permitted to hear the defendant's confession after stating
"Wellt ahf should I have a lawyer, I mean, well, Fm really not worried about anything, it is just
that.,." Appellate Judge Onne concluded that it was an equivocal request for counsel and
needed to be clarified before the interrogation could proceed. The same situation exists here.
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POINT IIL DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS - DENIED PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY.
In addition, if effective assistance of counsel was provided Mr. Houston would
have and could have compelled the prosecutorial immunity he was offered. The agreement to
treat Mr. Houston fairly was "promised.* During the negotiation, Mr. Houston undeniably
was informed that if he came clean with the three investigators and Mr. Langston that he could
be charged with a misdemeanor instead of a felony, or be given drug court, or probation and
no jail time. These were all enticements made to Defendant in a quid pro quo fashion in
exchange for information which would letizo a clandestine lab. Defendant never told the
investigators to walk. Instead, the state was told that Houston would purchase the crystal
iodine and sell it or trade it to John Paul Fazzio* That fact was admitted by Sgt. Harrison at
the time of trial Not until after trial was it discovered that in deed, shortly after Houston's
arrest, Mr. Fazzio was charged for possession of Clandestine Lab Equipment. See Seventh
District Court case no. 031403751, That stop and arrest is likely the direct result of the
discussions made between Mr. Houston and the investigators and Mr. Langston. With this
undisputed fact, it is clear the an offer was made, accepted and defendant was entitled to the
quid pro quo benefit of his information. Clearly, defendant is entitled to prosecutorial
immunity for other alleged crimes and or less than second-degree felony charges in exchange
for his helpful information which substantial l^d to the conviction of John Paul Fazzio and the
decommission of a clandestine meth lab*
In support of this argument, the defendant draws this Court's attention to State,,
v. Ward. 571 P,2d 1343 (Utah 1977). In that case, the Utah Supreme Court explained;
10

The grant of immunity is supposed to be for a quid pro quo in the form of information
from the grantee, who is or maybe involved in crime. That is, it is in essence a contract.
It is fundamental that when any agretfcnent is entered into it should reflect a meeting of
the minds of the parties who enter into it; and this in turn includes knowledge of the
foundational facts out of which the agreement arises and comes into being.
IdL, at 1346. In this matter. Defendant is the grantee. In light of the clear events recorded in the
State's December 30,2002 transcript of Mr. Houston's interrogation. Quid pro quo occurred in
the form of information (Mr. Houston's coming clean) in exchange for a lesser penalty, In this
situation, Mr. Houston was offered many enticements: (1) misdemeanor in stead of a seconddecree felony charge, (2) probation, and (3) drug court. None of this occurred, even in the
context of Mr. Langston's ^promise" to be fair with him. Well, Mr. Houston has not been treated
fairly even though he came clean that he would trade crystal iodine for cash or meth. His
confession was that of a violation of Section 58-37C-I9, The sell or distribution of crystal iodine
in amounts larger than two ounces by a licer^rd person to an unlicensed person is guilty of a
class B misdemeanor That offense is not a felony.

POINT IV. DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS - UNFAIR TRIAL.
In this matter, the Defendant asserts he was prejudiced at the time of trial by
ineffective assistance of counsel. Moreover, he asserts additional prejudicial error that he
should have been advised of if he was forced to act as his own attorney at the time of triaL In
this matter, without conceding the point, this Court made findings and declared that Mr.
Houston waived his right to counsel before calling a jury. The Supreme Court in State v.
Harmon. 854 P.2d 1037 (Utah Ct App, 1993) stated that before the court may find a
fundamental right was waived it must be kyrxwr and convincing evidence. On or about
li
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January 19, 2005, this Court led Mr* Houston to believe that counsel would be appointed for
him at trial by his submission of an affidavit of indigency immediately. January 19. 2005 was
a Thursday. Taking two days to complete afinancialstatement which calls for income
information and monthly expenses in not a clear violation of the court's instruction. Accuracy
and completeness under penalty of perjury must be regarded* Ultimately, the affidavit was
faxed to the Court on Monday, January 24, 2005 at 11:30 p.m. The judge did not receive it
from his clerk until Tuesday afternoon* In the scope of the case, having two attorneys be
permitted to withdraw without proper substitution after more thaa two years of case history
caused Mr. Houston prejudice.
Notwithstanding, other notable error that without may not have resulted in the
felony conviction. It appears that the Court tried to treat Mr. Houston fairly by taking judicial
notice of hearsay testimony and striking it. However, on two of the occasions where
information was stricken, the jury was not instructed that when information is stricken how the
jury would treat the stricken information. Moreover, at the time of the hearing on this motion,
the defense wishes an opportunity to examine the Court file to determine what written jury
instructions were submitted to the jury during deliberation* Consistent with Maestas, supra.,
Defendant is looking for a Long instruction. Furthermore, it is clear from a review of the trial
audio recordings that the Court did not invoke the exclusionary rule on Defendant's behalf,
since Mr, Houston lacked the legal skill, knowledge and experience to make such a request of
the Court,
In support in this argument, Defendant refers this Court to paretta v, California.

12

422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct, 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975). In thai matter, the defendant chose to
represent himself, as opposed to this matter, where he was forced to* The High Court
reasoned:
When an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter,
many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. For this reason, in
order to represent himself, the accused must 'knowingly and intelligently1 forgo those
relinquished benefits. Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U-S„ at 464-465, 58 S. Ct, at 1023. Cf.
Von Moltkev, Gillies. 332 U.S. 708,723-724, 68 S« Ct. 316, 323, 92 L, Ed. 309
(plurality opinion of Black, J.). Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and
experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose selfrepresentation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation, so that the record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his
choice is made with eyes open/ Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann. 317 U.S,, at
279,63S.Ct.,at242.
Id., at 835. Implicit in the Faretta decision is the claim that Faretta, once made aware of what he
was choosing to do he would befreeto represent himself Key in that case is the Adams's quote*
"he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open." In this matter, the defendant
on the morning of the trial was made aware that he was going forward that day without counsel.
That he was informed thsLdax h e ^ a d waived therightof counsel and was having to represent
himself. Unfortunately for Mr, Houston, his representation of himself was without the benefit of
knowing what he was required to do and the decision was not his to make with his eyes open. In
this matter is was obvious from a review of the trial recordings, Mr, Houston did not effectively
know how to cross examine, many of his questions were statements some rather damning
statements, that he did not know what hearsay was, that he was not aware of the exclusionary
rule and that lesser included offenses and other defenses were available to him at the trial. In
addition, Jennifer McNair'stestimonywas not founded on her personal knowledge. Admittedly,
she was not the testing chemist, she only reviewed the work of a colleague. Clearly from the
13
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testimony adduced inadequate foundation was lain by Ms. McNair, Also, it was clearfromthe
testimony of Colleen Davis was inadmissible. In her testimony, Mrs. Davis testified that she
only had personal knowledge of selling crystal iodine to the defendant. It was not clarified by
counsel that she meant that she could only speak of those occasions she was involved, meaning
others could have sold to other individuals claiming to purchase on Houston's behalf. In
other words, she was unaware of others using Houston's name. However, it was left
unresolved suggesting to the jury she had addressed the question directly and affirmatively.
Also, Sgt. Harrison testified as to hearsay concerning John Paul Fazzio's alleged
involvement. He testified that he or they "were advised . . . . * * It would appear due to the
Court lack of objection for hearsay on Mr. Houston's behalf, the Court must have assumed
the advisement came from Mr. Houston. However, from a defense attorney's perspective it is
clear that he was testifying about another speaking to him.
The undersigned counsel wishes to point out that he does not fault the court for
its decision to move this matter along on the trial date in question. If placed in a comparable
situation, the undersigned might decide the same as this Court did. It is frustrating to the
court, the parties, and witnesses alike for trial dates to be wasted and matters be dragged
along. As a defense attorney, the undersigned empathizes with the Court and has shared in
those frustrations. However, as expressed in Powell vT Alabama. 287 U,S, 45, 53 S, Ct. 55,
77 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1932), the we all have little choice but to grant a continuance to afford
counsel In PowelL the High Court reasoned:
It is true that great and inexcusable delay in the enforcement of our criminal law is one of
the grave evils of our time. Continuances arefrequentlygranted for unnecessarily long
14

periods of time, and delays incident to the disposition of motions for new trial and
hearings upon appeal have come in many cases to be a distinct reproach to the
administration ofjustice. The prompt disposition of criminal cases is to be commended
and encouraged. But in reaching thauesult a defendant, charged with a serious crime,
must not be stripped of his right to have sufficient time to advise with counsel and
prepare his defense. To do that is not to proceed promptly in the claim spirit of regulated
justice but to go forward with the haste of the mob.
Defendant expressed concern on two occasions about going forward without
counsel and expressed his concern for time to prepare. At the commencement of day one, the
defendant requested for the opportunity to contact witnesses, the Court limited him to contact
during a recess. The following day, the defendant expressed concern about time to prepare
questions to ask himself when he was to take the stand. It was just the day before that the
Court informed him when, or if, he was to take the stand, he would not be permitted to
ramble, but that he would be required to asked and answer questions only. In response to the
question, the Court warned Houston that he would have already been prepared. However, it
was only that morning the Court informed Houston that because the State had rested, Houston
could then "now" present his case. Afterwards, the Court permitted defendant 15 minutes to
prepare. After this matter, languished along for two years at the direction of Margret Taylor,
granting Mr. Houston 15 minutes to manage the entire defense of his case, seems hardly fair.

CONCLUSION.
Because of the well-defined pretrial and plain trial errors outlined above, a
manifest injustice has occurred. Mr. Houston had not waived his right to a fair trial, he had
not waived his right even to counsel. Even during the interrogation process, Mr. Houston

is

expressed an equivocal request for counsel. But for the promises and agreements made been
the prosecutor, Brent Langston, to come clean and the apparent quid pro quo for information,
Mr. Langston received the benefits of Mr. Houston's information without any return favors.
Nonetheless, Mr, Houston only confessed misdemeanor crimes. In short, Mr. Houston should
not have been convicted of 13 second-degree felonies. But for ineffective assistance of
counsel, pretrial errors, dishonored agreements, and his own admissions, Defendant .should not
have been convicted on even one second-degree felony. These convictions resulting from the
January 26-28, 2005 trial should be vacated; a new trial should be granted; and defendant
should be granted the opportunity to seek reduced charges. His conduct and admissions were
misdemeanors only in violation of Section 58-37c-l9. In the alternative, defendant would
settle for the sentence to be commuted to misdemeanor convictions and or a new trial with the
lesser included offense instruction of 58-37c-l9. Clearly a reasonable jury could return a
verdict in the defendant's favor along these above argued points of law, given the facts at
hand.
Dated this 23rd day of Ma;h, 2005.

D. BRUCE OLIVER
Attorney for Defendant

id

C1»»TIFTCATE OF MAILING
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on this 23rd day of March, 2005,1
served a copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL upon the counsel for the Defendant in this matter, and other presumed interested
parties by mailing it to counsel by first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the
following addresses: David A. Blackwell, W. Brent Langston, P.O. Box 249, Castle, Utah
84513.
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IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FQR MAY 2 7 2005
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

l l j ^
THE STATE OF UTAH,

RULING ON MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL

Plaintiff,
VS.
JEFFERY HOUSTON,
Defendant.

Case No. 031700004
Judge Bryce K. Bryner

The defendant was convicted by a jury on January 28, 2005, of thirteen counts of
VIOLATION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE PRECURSOR ACT, each a Second Degree
Felony. A pre-sentence report was ordered and the sentence was imposed on March 14, 2005.
The defendant was sentenced to serve 1-15 years in the Utah State Prison on each count and the
sentences were to be served concurrently. The defendant was also ordered to pay a fine in the
total amount of $5,000 00 which covered all counts.
On March 24, 2005, the defendant filed a Motion for New Trial together with a
Memorandum Supporting Motion for New Trial. The State of Utah filed a Response to
Defendant's Motion for New Trial and the matter is ripe for decision.
The defendant's Motion for New Trial claims that he was deprived of due process in three
areas: (1) denial of effective assistance of counsel; (2) denial of prosecutorial immunity; and (3)
unfair trial. The court will address each claim individually.
I. Was the defendant denied effective assistance of counsel?
A review of the file shows that the defendant was represented by Margret Taylor on a
private basis from February, 2003, to November 18, 2005, when the defendant dismissed her on
the day that he was scheduled to enter a plea pursuant to a plea bargain. The defendant then

employed Mr. Bruce Oliver who represented the defendant for approximately one week in
December, 2004, and then withdrew with the permission of the court on December 16, 2004,
because the defendant would not stay in contact with Mr. Oliver. The defendant represented
himself during the three day jury trial on January 26-28, 2005, after having been admonished by
the court several times to obtain counsel. Mr. Oliver re-entered the case on March 25, 2005,
when he filed the Motion for New Trial which is the subject of this ruling.
A. Failure to suppress statements made during interrogation: The defendant claims his
first attorney, Margret Taylor, provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to suppress
the defendant's statements made during his interrogation by law enforcement officers on
December 30, 2002. The determination of this issue hinges on whether the defendant, while
under arrest and in custody in the Emery County Sheriffs office on December 30, 2005,
requested, or knowingly and intelligently waived his right to, counsel.
A review of the transcript of the interview shows that the defendant, prior to questioning,
was advised by Officer Harrison of his Miranda rights. The defendant responded by stating that
he understood his rights and that he did not "have any problem" in talking to the officers. (Tr. at
p. 1-2). The defendant does not claim that he was not adequately advised of his Miranda rights
or that he did not waive them, but asserts that later in the interrogation he made an "equivocal
request" for counsel when he stated, "With - Why I wanted him here is - is that I land of -1 kind
of need to know my position - where I sit before I incriminate myself any further." Id. at p. 39.
(Underlining added). The State of Utah claims that the "him" referred to was the prosecutor, not
a defense attorney, and that the defendant while being interrogated never made any request to talk
to his own attorney at any time.
After examining the context in which the defendant claims he made his "equivocal request,"
the court finds that the defendant was not requesting to talk to counsel, but was requesting to talk
to Brent Langston, the Deputy Emery County Attorney, whom the defendant believed would be
able to enlighten him as to any deals the prosecutor's office might be willing to make. This

explains his statement that "I land of need to know my position - where I sit before I incriminate
myself any further." The dialogue between the defendant and the officers on the three pages
immediately prior to his statement clearly indicate that the defendant was referring to the deputy
County Attorney and was not making an "equivocal request" for counsel. At no time during the
interrogation did the defendant use the word "lawyer" or "attorney" or anything like unto it, and
the court cannot find that he equivocally invoked his right to counsel by any other language.
The defendant also claims the benefit of an alleged equivocal request for counsel during the
interrogation when he said, "One of the things I'm worried about, I guess, is, uh, incriminating
myself as far as my involvement with it. Uh, I -1 don't understand how..." Tr. at p. 49. The
context in which the statement was made clearly shows that the defendant was concerned about
incriminating himself by making a delivery of iodine to a person running a meth lab. See Tran.
at p. 43 et. seq., and that it was not an equivocal request for counsel.
Because the defendant waived his right to counsel at the outset of the interrogation and did
not make a later equivocal request for counsel, Margret Taylor was not dilatory and did not
provide ineffective assistance of counsel by not filing a motion to suppress the confession made
to the officers.
B. Failure to have all but one charge dismissed (Denial of Prosecutorial Immunity): The
defendant also claims that had he had effective assistance of counsel he "could have compelled
the prosecutorial immunity he was offered," the charges against him would have been limited to
one second degree felony at trial, or he would have plead guilty to misdemeanor charges, or, in
the alternative, he "would have [had] the benefit of reduced offenses or lesser included offenses
presented to the jury at trial." Def. Motion to Suppress at p. 8 and 10.
The defendant does not cite to any specific page in the transcript to support his allegations
and the court is left to speculate where the specific alleged promises were made to the defendant
by the officers or Mr. Langston during the interrogation. After reviewing the entire transcript the
court cannot find that any specific, definite, promises were made to the defendant or that a

meeting of the minds was reached. Moreover, although the defendant claims that he is entitled to
a quid pro quo, there is no post-interrogation evidence or affidavit furnished by defendant to
support his claim that any information he gave the officers or the prosecutor led to the arrest of
John Paul Fazzio
The court also finds that the defendant's claim that he should have been charged with a
misdemeanor instead of a felony is without merit because there is no evidence that the defendant
is a person licensed to sell iodine. The mere fact that the defendant received a farrier's license
from a private school or a certificate of completion of a farrier's course in Oklahoma does not
qualify him as a person licensed to engage in a regulated transaction within the meaning of the
controlled substances act
C. Failure to include a "Long" instruction: The defendant claims Margret Taylor provided
ineffective assistance of counsel by not requesting a Long jury instruction at trial. Trans, at p. 8.
First of all, Margret Taylor was not the defendant's counsel at trial. The defendant terminated
her employment more than two months prior to the beginning of the trial. Margret Taylor was
not obligated to provide a jury instruction to the court for a former client.
Second, a Long jury instruction cautions the jury as to the pitfalls of eyewitness
identification. State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986). However, no reference to any specific
witness is made in the defendant's memorandum and the court is left to speculate why such an
instruction should have been given.
D. Waiver of Preliminary Hearing: The defendant claims that his previous counsel was
ineffective because she had the defendant waive preliminary hearing. He argues that had the
preliminary hearing not been waived, the court would have concluded that under the doctrine of
Ejusdem Generis that as a licensed farrier, the defendant did not commit a violation of Section
58-37c-l 1, but rather committed a violation of Section 58-37c-19, a misdemeanor. Trans, at p. 9.
In making the above claim, the defendant presupposes that he is a licensed farrier and
therefore legally entitled to sell iodine to another person, thus falling within the purview of

Section 58-37c-19. There was no evidence presented at trial that the defendant has a license that
entitles him to resell iodine. The defendant uses the term "licensed farrier" when the only
evidence presented at trial with regard to being a licensed is a certificate of completion of a
farrier school in Oklahoma. There was no evidence presented at trial to show that the certificate
qualifies the defendant to re-sell iodine under the Utah Controlled Substances Act.
II. Unfair Trial
The defendant asserts prejudicial error by being forced to act as his own attorney at the time
of trial. Specifically, the defendant claims that on January 19, 2005, the court misled him into
believing that counsel would be appointed immediately upon his filing of an Affidavit of
Indigency. The defendant has not provided a transcript, affidavit, or other evidence to support
this assertion. The defendant did not submit the Affidavit of Indigency to the court until it was
faxed to the court on January 24, 2005, at 11:30 p.m. The court did not see the affidavit until the
day of trial - January 26, 2005, at which time the court found that it was submitted untimely and
declined to appoint counsel at that time.
It is significant to note that after Ms. Margret Taylor's services were terminated on
November 18, 2004, the court ordered the defendant to appear before the court on several
occasions to advise the court on his progress on hiring counsel. Each time the court admonished
the of the importance of employing counsel but defendant procrastinated the hiring of counsel
even though he was working in the coal mines.
Lastly, the defendant claims that, because the defendant was representing himself, the court
should have assisted the defendant by invoking the exclusionary rule with regard to witnesses on
defendant's behalf and by making objections to evidence on defendant's behalf. The court
rejects these assertions as not being the law even though the defendant was pro se.
For the reasons set forth above, the Motion for New Trial is denied.
DATED this 27th day of May, 2005.

C~3Uc^<^^f^
/ Esryce K. Bryner,
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Briefs and Other Related Documents
This case was not selected for publication in the
Federal Reporter.Please use FIND to look at the
applicable circuit court rule before citing this
opinion. Tenth Circuit Rule 36.3. (FIND CTA10
Rule 36.3.)
United States Court of Appeals,Tenth Circuit.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Michael F. LOY, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 04-3444.
Jan. 25, 2006.
Background: Defendant was convicted in the
United States District Court for the District of
Kansas on a plea of guilty to one count of mail
fraud, two counts of wire fraud, and one count of
interstate transportation of stolen property, and was
sentenced to 63 months' imprisonment, followed by
two years of supervised release, and ordered to pay
$239,752 in restitution. Defendant appealed.

110 Criminal Law
110XV Pleas
110k272 Plea of Guilty
110k273.1 Voluntary Character
110k273.1(l) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Defendant's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary,
and not the product of fear or intimidation; district
court found, based on its observation of defendant
throughout the entire proceeding, that the defendant
was not intimidated, but rather, was confident and
sure of himself at each court proceeding.
[2] Criminal Law 110 €=>641.4(4)
110 Criminal Law
110XX Trial
110XX(B) Course and Conduct of Trial in
General
110k641 Counsel for Accused
110k641.4 Waiver of Right to Counsel
110k641.4(4) k. Validity and
Sufficiency, Particular Cases. Most Cited Cases
Criminal Law 110 €=>641.7(1)

Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Stephen H.
Anderson, Circuit Judge, held that:
1(1) defendant's guilty plea was knowing and
voluntary, and not the product of fear or
intimidation, and
2(2) defendant's stubborn failure to hire an attorney
in connection with the guilty plea was a knowing
and intelligent waiver of the right to assistance of
counsel

Affirmed.
West Headnotes
[1] Criminal Law 110 €==>273.1(1)

110 Criminal Law
110XX Trial
HOXX(B) Course and Conduct of Trial in
General
110k641 Counsel for Accused
110k641.7 Affirmative Duties in
Protection of Right
110k641.7(l) k. In General; Advice,
Preliminary Inquiry and Appointment by Court.
Most Cited Cases
Defendant's stubborn failure to hire an attorney in
connection with a guilty plea was a knowing and
intelligent waiver of the right to assistance of
counsel; defendant, an educated professional with
some familiarity with the workings of the judicial
system, repeatedly assured the court that he was in
the process of retaining counsel, only to appear at
the next scheduled court appearance without such
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an attorney, and he was permitted to represent
himself only after the court warned defendant
repeatedly of the dangers inherent in representing
himself, cautioned him not to do so, and inquired
whether the decision he was making was voluntary.

to his indictment, Loy was represented by attorney
John Ambrosio.
FN1. More specifically, Loy was charged
with one count of mail fraud, two counts of
wire fraud, three counts of money
laundering, two counts of forging an
endorsement on a security, and four counts
of interstate transportation of stolen
property.

*747 Lan G. Metzger, Office of the United States
Attorney, Wichita, KS, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Kurt P. Kerns, Ariagno, Kerns, Mank & White,
Wichita, KS, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before HENRY, ANDERSON,
Circuit Judges.

and

O'BRIEN,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT™*
FN* This order and judgment is not
binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral
estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders
and judgments; nevertheless, an order and
judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.STEPHEN
H. ANDERSON, Circuit Judge.
**1 Defendant Michael F. Loy pled guilty, *748
pursuant to a plea agreement, to one count of mail
fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, two counts
of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and
one count of interstate transportation of stolen
property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314. He was
sentenced to sixty-three months' imprisonment,
followed by two years of supervised release, and
was ordered to pay $239,752.32 in restitution.
Loy's subsequent motion to withdraw his guilty plea
was denied by the district court. He appeals that
denial. We affirm.

BACKGROUND
On October 21, 2003, a twelve-count indictment
charged Loy, a certified public accountant, with
various counts of mail fraud, wire fraud, money
laundering, forging an endorsement on a security,
and interstate transportation of stolen property.™1
In early plea negotiations with the government prior
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

Loy made his first appearance before Magistrate
Judge Karen Humphreys on November 5, 2003.
Attorney Chris Meek appeared with Loy but did not
enter an appearance. Loy informed the court that
he was in the process of retaining Meek as his
counsel. Magistrate Judge Humphreys scheduled
the case for arraignment on November 12, 2003, in
order to accommodate Meek's schedule.
Loy appeared at his arraignment on November 12,
accompanied by Assistant Federal Public Defender
Timothy Henry. Henry did not enter his
appearance. When questioned by the court
concerning counsel, Loy represented that he would
finalize his arrangements for retention of counsel by
the following Friday. Magistrate Judge Humphreys
informed Loy that he should "feel free to call Mr.
Henry" if he needed help obtaining counsel. R.
Vol. II at 154. The magistrate judge continued the
arraignment until November 19. On November 19,
Loy had still not retained counsel, so the
arraignment was again continued, this time until
December 3, 2003.
Meanwhile, on November 13, 2003, the district
court issued a General Order of Discovery and
Scheduling, providing for a trial date of January 13,
2004.
On December 3, 2003, Loy appeared before
Magistrate Judge Donald Bostwick for arraignment,
and he again was without counsel. The magistrate
judge asked Loy if he was "going to be able to
retain counsel." Id at 158. Loy responded, "[y]es,
Your Honor. I apologize for the delay." Id at
158-59. The magistrate judge expressed concern
that the delay in retaining counsel would make it
im to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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difficult for the attorney to adequately represent
Loy at trial. When Loy asked whether an attorney
could enter an appearance at a later date, the
magistrate judge responded that an attorney could
enter an appearance at any time. When the
magistrate judge asked Loy if he was prepared to
proceed to arraignment, Loy responded that he was
comfortable proceeding by himself.
The magistrate judge accordingly proceeded with
arraignment, informing Loy in detail of the charges
against him, to which he pled not guilty. At the
conclusion of the arraignment proceedings, the
magistrate judge told Loy:
**2 I cannot say to you more emphatically that you
need to get an attorney and get an attorney
immediately because things are going to start[ ]
rolling very fast *749 with [district court] Judge
Brown and if you don't get an attorney, we're going
to get into some real problems in this case.
Id at 168-69. When asked whether the retention of
Meek as Loy's counsel was imminent, Loy
responded that Meek would be retained "[w]ithin
the next week." Id at 169. Meek did not,
however, enter an appearance as counsel.
On December 18, 2003, the district court granted
the government's motion to set a status conference
and scheduled the conference for December 29,
2003. Loy failed to appear at the conference on the
29th, but because there was some question whether
he had received notice of the conference, the status
conference was rescheduled for December 31,
2003. On December 31, Loy appeared at the status
conference before the district court with Assistant
Federal Public Defender Steve Gradert, whom the
court had asked to attend to assist Loy as needed.
At this hearing, the district court asked Loy if he
had obtained counsel, to which Loy replied that he
was meeting with Meek the following Tuesday to
finalize arrangements for representation. Loy also
informed the court that he could afford counsel.
The district court informed Loy that an attorney
would be appointed for him if he could not afford
one, but that if he could afford an attorney, he
would either have to hire counsel or represent
himself. The court further reminded Loy that he
was an educated man with experience in the court

system, and that he faced a maximum penalty of
twenty years on many counts of the indictment, and
ten years on another one.
The court then postponed the status conference until
January 2, 2004, instructing Loy to have his
attorney present at that conference. The court
further told Loy "if you don't have an attorney or
can't tell me what you're going to do about this by
that time, bring your toothbrush," and it
admonished Loy "[a] man of your intellectual ]
background and experience gets very little tolerance
from me when they don't exercise that and common
sense and do what you're supposed to do. Playing
around with the Federal courts is not going to work.
Do you understand?" Id at 188. Loy responded
that he understood. Gradert stated, "I know Mr.
Loy had meant no disrespect to the Court. He's had
financial difficulties that have prevented him from
being able to get counsel retained, but he's taken
care of those financial requirements, and I think it
shouldn't be a problem at this time." Id at 189-90.
FN2

FN2. The government also informed the
court at the December 31 status conference
that it was having difficulty contacting
Loy, inasmuch as his home telephone had
been disconnected and Loy repeatedly
failed to answer his cell phone.
At the January 2, 2004, status conference, Loy
again informed the court that he did not have
counsel. An assistant public defender told the
court that Loy was attempting to sell some property
to obtain the necessary funds and that the sale
would be complete by the following Monday. Loy
told the court that, as of then, he lacked the money
to pay an attorney. The court accordingly
appointed Mike Hepperly, a member of the panel of
attorneys available to be appointed by the court to
represent defendants who cannot afford counsel
under the Criminal Justice Act ("CJA"), 18 U.S.C. §
3006A, to represent Loy. Hepperly entered his
appearance as appointed counsel. Loy informed
the court that he had discussed personally retaining
Hepperly after he obtained sufficient fluids. The
court then scheduled another status conference for
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January 5,2004.

Id at 247-48.

**3 Represented by Hepperly, Loy appeared at the
January 5 status conference *750 and filed a motion
to continue the trial. The district court granted a
120-day continuance. Hepperly informed the court
that he had discussed with Loy the financial
affidavit Loy would need to file to retain appointed
counsel and discovered that Loy did not qualify for
appointed counsel because his annual income was
between $80,000 and $100,000. Hepperly thus
told the court that he had advised Loy not to fill out
the financial affidavit because "[h]e clearly makes
too much income and has too many assets ... to be
able to have a CJA ... lawyer." R. Vol. II at 237.
Loy again stated that he wanted to retain Hepperly
once he had sufficient funds to pay him. Trial was
rescheduled for May 18, 2004. The court scheduled
another status conference for January 13.

At the January 20, 2004, status conference the court
asked Loy and Hepperly if arrangements for
counsel had been made and was told that they had
not been. When asked by the court for an
explanation, Loy responded, "Your Honor, I'm not
yet able to retain Mr. Hepperly, and so I'm ready to
proceed today representing myself, Your Honor."
Id. at 252. The following exchange then occurred:
THE COURT: Well, we've gone over that before,
and 111 remind you of all the things we had told
you-Judge Bostwick told you, but you-you're ready
to proceed on your own behalf?
THE DEFENDANT: (Nodded head up and down.)
THE COURT: All right. For your services, Mr.
Hepperly, I will make whatever arrangements are
necessary.
MR. HEPPERLY: Certainly, Your Honor.
**4 THE COURT: I appreciate your services.
And I just want to remind you, Mr. Loy, that any
pretrial motions are to be filed by April 26th of
2004. The trial is set for May 18th of 2004, and
we will go to trial on that day. If you have any
discovery or need anything in the way of-for your
own defense, why, you should let us know.
Judge Bostwick went over very carefully with you,
didn't he, the problems *751 about your pro se
representation and the dangers that are involved
with it?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, Your Honor, he did.
THE COURT: You're well aware of them, I take it.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, and he said that I
was allowed to add counsel any time during
proceedings.
THE COURT: You can, but that will not be-will
not be for the purposes of delay.
THE DEFENDANT: Correct. That's correct,
Your Honor.
THE COURT: You understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Have you ever represented yourself
in a criminal case?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I've explained to you the
punishment if you're found guilty in this case and
what it is, you understand.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And have you ever had anything to

At the January 13 status conference, Hepperly told
the court that he had not yet been personally
retained by Loy, and that he was still a
CJA-appointed counsel. Hepperly asked that the
status conference be continued for a week so he
could clarify his status as Loy's counsel. The court
again urged Loy to obtain counsel, stating "time's
running out for you to get somebody to get in here
and give you the representation that you-any
defendant deserves." Id. at 246-47. The court
continued the status conference until January 20,
stating "[a]nd at that time, 111 expect you to have
counsel in view of your statements that you're able
to pay for counsel." Id. at 247. The following
exchange then occurred between the court and Loy:
THE COURT: Once more. Again, I'm continuing
this case in abundance of precaution to see that you
have adequate counsel.
DEFENDANT LOY: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: If that isn't arranged, then we're-you
have two alternatives; you'll be representing
yourself or your very adequate counsel retained.
DEFENDANT LOY: Yes, sir, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And as I told you, I don't
recommend you represent yourself.
DEFENDANT LOY: That's correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Even as well trained as you are and
the background as a CPA and as a person familiar
with the workings of our judicial system.
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

im to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

^ ^*^=T*nn^80000006753000... 5/18/2006

Page 5 of 11

Page 5

164 FedAppx. 747
164 FedAppx. 747, 2006 WL 172366 (C.A.IO (Kan.))
(Cite as: 164 Fed.Appx. 747)
do with the guidelines?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, the library is where you can
find them. You know that.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, Your Honor.
THE COURT: You know you're on your own, that
the Court can't help you.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, Your Honor, that's
correct.
THE COURT: Have you had any experience with
the federal rules of criminal behavior-evidence?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: They will apply to your case and
what your evidence may be.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, like we've said before, and
I've told you I think it is my opinion that a trained
lawyer would defend you far better than you can
represent yourself. I think it's unwise for you to try.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Of course you are familiar with
certain phases of the law, the tax law.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: You're a CPA and accountant.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: That's-and while that has some
elements of criminal problems with it that you are
probably familiar with, I don't think you've had
anything to do with the rules of evidence before,
have you?
THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, we've all told you we don't
think you should represent yourself, and I don't
think repeating it here is going to do any good.
THE DEFENDANT: Understood, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And is your decision entirely
voluntary?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Due to all the things I've previously
told you, Judge Bostwick has told you, your
attorney has probably told you, the government's
advised you about, you still desire to represent
yourself and give up your right to be represented by
a lawyer.
**5 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And your decision again is entirely
voluntary.
THE DEFENDANT: That is correct.
THE COURT: Well, I find the defendant has
© 2006 Thomson/West. No
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knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to
counsel, and I will *752 therefore permit the
defendant to represent himself.
You understand again when all motions in this case
must be filed.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And when the trial is going to be.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I've done this many times before
with people. I do want to indicate to you I've never
had one acquitted who represented himself.
THE DEFENDANT: I understand, sir.
Id. at 252-56. Hepperly then gave Loy a letter
indicating that Hepperly no longer was Loy's
counsel.
On April 19, 2004, the government filed a motion
to continue the trial. The district court scheduled a
status conference for May 3 to consider the motion
to continue. Loy failed to appear at the May 3
conference, but telephoned the clerk's office to
inform the court that he was having problems with
his car and would be unable to attend. After
discussing the government's conflicts with the May
18 trial date previously set, the court granted the
motion to continue the trial until June 29,2004.
On June 24, during a scheduled change of plea
hearing,™3 Loy told the court that he had
discussed a plea agreement with the government,
but was not prepared to enter into it at that time.
On June 29, the day scheduled for the
commencement of the trial, Loy failed to appear.
The government told the court that the FBI agent
assigned to the case had received a call at 10:00
p.m. the night before (June 28) from Darla
Peterson, Loy's girlfriend, stating that Loy had
checked into the hospital with chest pains and
would not be appearing in court on the 29th.
Government counsel observed that, while it was
possible Loy had a heart attack which prevented his
appearance at trial, it was also possible that this was
another ploy to delay the proceedings. The court
then acquiesced in the government's request to issue
a forty-eight hour bench warrant for Loy, to allow
an investigation into Loy's alleged medical
problems. The court also issued a subpoena to
obtain Loy's medical records from the hospital and
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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from Loy's physician. On July 1, 2004, an arrest
warrant was issued for Loy. On July 3, Loy
voluntarily surrendered to the Sedgwick County
detention facility.
FN3, Apparently, on June 14, government
counsel, Assistant United States Attorney
Metzger, contacted the court and informed
the court that the parties had reached a
plea agreement. Accordingly, the court
scheduled a change of plea hearing for
June 24.
On July 6, Loy appeared with Gradert before
Magistrate Judge Bostwick for a hearing on whether
Loy's failure to appear at his trial was a violation of
the conditions of his pretrial release. The
following exchange occurred:
THE COURT: ....Before I go any further, you have
said throughout these proceedings that you wish to
proceed without a lawyer or you were retaining a
private lawyer.
[THE DEFENDANT]: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. As I recall, you appeared
first in front of Judge Humphreys and told her you
were going to retain Mr. Christopher Meek and it
was a matter of selling some real estate and you
would get him hired.
**6 [THE DEFENDANT]: Yes, Your Honor. I
was told that I didn't qualify earlier because of my
income but my income has changed drastically and
therefore I think I might qualify now, sir.
THE COURT: Did you sell the real estate?
*753 [THE DEFENDANT]: No sir. I actually
didn't have the real estate in my name. It was
family that was trying to get the funds.
THE COURT: So are you asking me now to
consider the appointment of counsel for you?
[THE DEFENDANT]: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I have a Financial Affidavit Form
which bears your signature and today's date.
[THE DEFENDANT]: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Do you recall providing information
concerning your assets, your employment and your
income to Pretrial Services before the hearing
today?
[THE DEFENDANT]: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Was everything that you told them
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

-

about your income, your assets, your expenses and
your employment true and correct?
[THE DEFENDANT]: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. It indicates here that
through June of this year ... [y]ou earned a total of
$23,000.
[THE DEFENDANT]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Who is ML & Company?
[THE DEFENDANT]: That's an accounting firm
there in Pittsburgh that I and my brother own.
THE COURT: So you own an ownership interest in
that firm?
[THE DEFENDANT]: Well, I have, yes, an
ownership interest in that firm; yes, sir.
THE COURT: [C]an you tell me what you believe
your half interest in that company is worth today?
[THE DEFENDANT]: Probably 10 to $20,000, my
share.
THE COURT: Now, when you were first
interviewed by Pretrial Services, you indicated you
were going to retain your own counsel and at that
time you told the Pretrial Services officer ... that
you were earning $8,000 a month from ML &
Company and that your total monthly expenses
were three or $4,000.
[THE DEFENDANT]: That is correct, sir.
THE COURT: What has changed since that time?
[THE DEFENDANT]: The publicity surrounding
my federal indictment has drastically limited the
ML & Company income.
THE COURT: And the real estate that you told
Judge Humphreys you were in the process of selling
to get cash to retain Mr. Christopher Meek when
you appeared in front of her in November of 2003,
you now say is owned by somebody else?
[THE DEFENDANT]: In the family, yes, sir. It's
not owned by me. It never was owned by me.
THE COURT: Who did own it?
[THE DEFENDANT]: It was my ex-wife and her
family. Not officially divorced, Your Honor, but
separated. Have been separated for about six
years, Your Honor.
Id. at 326-32. Magistrate Judge Bostwick observed
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that, had Loy appeared before him the first time
making these representations concerning his
financial condition, and if they were correct, Loy
would probably have been provided appointed
counsel. However, given the trial schedule, the
*754 magistrate judge declined to appoint counsel.
**7 With respect to his failure to appear for trial on
June 29, Loy testified that he did not appear in court
because he experienced chest pains the evening of
June 28 and was admitted to the intensive care unit
of a hospital for testing and was released on June 29
at 4:15 p.m. The government responded that Loy's
hospital records indicated he had normal vital signs
when he was admitted complaining of chest pains,
and that a heart catheterization procedure indicated
that the chest pain was not caused by any cardiac
condition. The government further informed the
court that Loy did not call the district court, the
U.S. Attorney's office or the U.S. Probation Office
when he was dismissed from the hospital, but
instead went to a baseball game. The government
asserted that Loy failed to call anyone on June 30 or
July 1, and only finally contacted the FBI on the
evening of July 2. FN4 The magistrate judge found
that, based on that evidence, Loy violated the
conditions of his release, and the judge revoked
Loy's bond and ordered him detained pending trial.

FN4. There was testimony that Loy left a
message with the U.S. Attorney's office
late in the afternoon of July 1, but he failed
to contact the FBI until the next day.
Following the hearing before Magistrate Judge
Bostwick, Loy, accompanied by Gradert, appeared
in district court for a status hearing. The district
court observed that the case was set for trial the
following day, July 7, 2004. Loy requested that, in
light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct.
2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004),™* the court
appoint counsel to represent him. Gradert indicated
his willingness to represent Loy, but that he would
need time to prepare. The government argued that
Loy was simply trying to delay the trial and that he
had done the same thing-continually claiming he
was going to get a lawyer but then failing to do
© 2006 Thomson/West. No
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so-in criminal proceedings filed against him by the
Kansas Securities Commission and in at least two
civil proceedings.
FN5. The Supreme Court in Blakely held
that in a state prosecution the Sixth
Amendment mandates that the maximum
permissible sentence for a defendant be
determined solely on the basis of "facts
reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by
the defendant." 542 U.S. at 304, 124 S.Ct.
2531.
The district court found that the government's
assertion was accurate and supported by the record.
It accordingly found that Loy was simply
employing a tactic to avoid the responsibility of
trial and to delay or prevent resolution of his case.
The court then appointed Gradert to serve as
standby counsel and released Loy to a halfway
house so he could prepare for his trial to commence
the next day.
Meanwhile, earlier that day, Loy and Gradert had
discussed the possibility of a plea agreement. At
approximately 4:00 p.m., after government counsel
and Loy and Gradert had discussed a plea
agreement for some one and one-half hours, the
court informed Loy that he had ten minutes to
decide whether to enter a guilty plea. Shortly
thereafter, Loy informed the court that he wished to
plead guilty. The district court accordingly
reconvened the hearing, and Loy pled guilty to one
count of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341
, two counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1343, and one count of transportation of stolen
property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314.
At the plea hearing, with Gradert as Loy's standby
counsel, the district court reviewed the plea
agreement with Loy, including the provisions of the
agreement waiving his right to appeal his conviction
and sentence and waiving his rights under *755
Blakely to have sentencing enhancements found by
a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The district
court reviewed the counts of the indictment and the
elements of each offense charged. The court
further reviewed the factual statement contained in
im to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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the plea agreement and Loy, under oath, admitted
that the facts contained in the factual statement were
accurate and truthful. The court reviewed the
sentencing enhancements specified in the factual
statement, and Loy admitted that the factual
statements relating to the sentencing enhancements
were accurate and truthful. Loy further admitted
that he knew he had the right to plead not guilty and
that by pleading guilty he would be giving up any
possible defenses to the charges against him. The
court reviewed the other rights Loy would be giving
up by pleading guilty. Loy admitted that he
understood that the sentence to be imposed on him
would be determined "solely by the United States
district judge and that the United States cannot and
has not made any promises or representations to
[him] as to the sentence" he would receive. R. Vol.
II at 306. Loy further admitted that he had been
furnished a copy of Blakely, that he had discussed it
with his standby counsel, that he agreed his
sentence would be determined according to the
sentencing guidelines and that he had no questions
concerning Blakely. He also acknowledged that he
would not be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea,
and that he had waived any appeal or collateral
attack on his conviction and sentence. He told the
court that he had had sufficient time to discuss his
case, the evidence, and the plea agreement with
standby counsel and that the agreement was the only
one he had entered into with the government.
**8 Loy further admitted he had entered into the
plea agreement freely and voluntarily, and the court
reminded him that the court did not later "want to
hear that you now think that you've been pressured
into signing this agreement. Have you?" to which
Loy responded "No, sir." Id. at 311-12. The court
reviewed the potential penalties faced by Loy, and
Loy acknowledged that he understood such
penalties. The court and Loy then had the
following exchange:
THE COURT: And, Mr. Loy, you know I'm not
going to let anybody plead guilty who maintains
he's innocent. With that in mind, are you telling
the Court that you're guilty?
DEFENDANT LOY: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: You're not claiming to be innocent?
DEFENDANT LOY: That is correct.
THE COURT: And you want to plead guilty and
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

have the Court accept that plea and have the clerk
enter a plea of guilty; is that right?
DEFENDANT LOY: Yes, Your Honor.
Id at 316. Loy accordingly pled guilty to counts
one, two, three and eleven of the indictment.
After finding that Loy's plea was freely and
voluntarily made because Loy was guilty, and was
not made "out of ignorance, fear, inadvertence, or
coercion" and was made "with a full understanding
of its consequences," the court accepted his plea of
guilty to the four counts. Id. at 319.
On July 12, 2004, a status conference was held and
the court issued an order modifying Loy's
conditions of release to permit him to stay in a
halfway house for one month.
On August 4, 2004, attorney Ken Kerns entered an
appearance in the case. On August 12, the court
granted Loy's motion to further modify the
conditions of release so he could remain at liberty
and work four days a week. On September 3, Loy
filed a motion for an extension of time to file
objections to the presentence report ("PSR"), which
the court granted.
*756 On September 23, Loy, through counsel, filed
a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He argued
that he was innocent, that he lacked the intent to
defraud any of his alleged victims, that he pled
guilty only to get himself out of jail, that he felt
intimidated by the district court when he pled guilty,
and that he felt he had little choice with trial
scheduled to commence the next day. He further
claimed that he had never waived his right to
counsel and did not receive effective assistance of
counsel, and that his guilty plea was not knowing
and voluntary but was made out of fear.
The government responded to Loy's motion to
withdraw his plea, arguing that the status of Loy's
legal representation was solely the result of his own
actions and representations to the court that he
could and would retain his own attorney, and that
his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. In his
reply to the government's response, Loy argued that
he had too much money to qualify for appointed
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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counsel but not enough to hire his own counsel, and
that his failure to retain counsel was not a ploy or
delaying tactic. He further argued that the
government had failed to provide him with
discovery as required by a court scheduling order.
**9 On October 25, 2004, a motion and sentencing
hearing was held, at which Loy was represented by
attorney Kerns. Kerns argued that Loy felt
pressured and coerced and that he entered into the
plea agreement in order to get out of jail. He
further argued that Loy got no benefit from the plea
agreement. Loy presented an affidavit from his
girlfriend, Darla Peterson, in which she stated that
she and Loy had attempted to sell 7.8 acres of land
in Crawford County, Kansas, beginning in February
2004, but that it had not been sold until July 2004,
at which time funds from that sale were used to
retain attorney Kems. FN6 Loy further argued that
the government had failed to provide him with
discovery until the Friday before trial, and therefore
any delay was at least partially the government's
fault.
FN6. This property was different from the
property owned by Loy's "ex-wife" and her
family, which he had previously told the
court was available for sale to generate
funds for an attorney.
The government proffered that, with respect to the
discovery issue, at the conclusion of the last status
conference with Loy in January 2004 the
government specifically told Loy that several boxes
of documents were available at the U.S. Attorney's
office for his review. The government further
averred that in January 2004 it had notified Loy that
it would provide him with all the marked trial
exhibits on the Friday before trial, and they so
notified him on that Friday. The government also
argued that Loy received a benefit from the plea
agreement because the government had agreed not
to bring additional charges against Loy, including
tax charges resulting from an active tax evasion
investigation of Loy. Finally, the government
argued that Loy's conduct with respect to obtaining
counsel was a "cat and mouse" game with the
district court, designed to delay going to trial, that
© 2006 Thomson/West. No
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Loy's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, and
that Loy's demeanor during the plea hearing
indicated that he was not afraid, intimidated or
coerced.
The district court denied Loy's motion to withdraw
his guilty plea, finding: that Loy "had the financial
means throughout this case to retain counsel" but
had "consistently refused to make appropriate
arrangements with an attorney"; that Loy had "
purposefully refrained from hiring an attorney" to
postpone resolution of his case; that Loy had
refused to file an affidavit supporting appointment
of counsel until the last minute; that Loy knowingly
and voluntarily waived the right to assistance*757
of counsel and voluntarily and knowingly decided
to represent himself; that the financial affidavit Loy
finally filed seeking to qualify for appointed
counsel was "vague, incomplete and in some
respects false" and that Loy had failed to show he
was financially unable to obtain counsel; that Loy's
"belated claim of financial inability was made in
bad faith for the purpose of obstructing" his
upcoming trial; that Loy's claim of innocence is "
flatly contradicted" by his statements under oath at
the plea hearing and in the plea agreement; that
granting the motion to withdraw the guilty plea
would result in prejudice to the government; that
Loy had delayed more than two months before
filing the motion to withdraw; that Loy's plea was
knowing and voluntary; that, based upon the court's
observation of Loy throughout the entire
proceeding, Loy was not intimidated but, rather,
was "confident and sure of himself at each court
proceeding"; that Loy's claimed
lack of
preparedness for his trial was "due solely to his
dilatory conduct"; that granting the motion to
withdraw would result in a tremendous waste of
judicial resources; that the government had not
improperly deprived Loy of any discovery; and that
there was accordingly no fair and just reason to
permit withdrawal of the plea. Id. at 382-84. The
court's subsequent written order largely reiterated
these findings.
**10 The court then conducted a sentencing
hearing, at which Loy was sentenced to sixty
months in prison on counts one, two and three, and
sixty-three months on count eleven, to be served
im to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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concurrently with the first sentence, for a total of
sixty-three months in prison, followed by two years
of supervised released, and he was ordered to pay
$239,752.32 in restitution. After Loy filed his
appeal of that order in our court, the government
filed a motion in our court to enforce the plea
agreement. This court then issued an order
reserving judgment on the government's motion and
ordering briefing on the merits to proceed. We
accordingly have this appeal and the government's
motion before us.
Loy argues on appeal that the district court erred in
denying his motion to set aside his guilty plea
because he is innocent, he was denied counsel, and
his plea was not voluntary and knowing because it
was made out of fear.
DISCUSSION
[1][2] " 'We review the district court's denial of a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of
discretion.' " United States v. Yazzie, 407 F.3d
1139, 1142 (10th Cir.) (en banc) (quoting United
States v. Jones, 168 F.3d 1217, 1219 (10th
Cir.1999)), cert, denied, — U.S. — , 126 S.Ct 303,
163 L.Ed.2d 263 (2005). A court considering
whether a defendant has presented a "fair and just
reason for withdrawal" of a guilty plea must
consider the following factors:
(1) whether the defendant has asserted his
innocence; (2) whether withdrawal would prejudice
the government; (3) whether the defendant delayed
in filing his motion, and if so, the reason for the
delay; (4) whether withdrawal would substantially
inconvenience the court; (5) whether close
assistance of counsel was available to the
defendant; (6) whether the plea was knowing and
voluntary; and (7) whether the withdrawal would
waste judicial resources.
Id. (quoting United States v. Sandoval, 390 F.3d
1294, 1298 (10th Cir.2004) (quotation marks
omitted)). As indicated in our lengthy recitation of
the district court's findings and conclusions in the
hearing on Loy's motion to withdraw his guilty plea,
the court carefully considered all of those factors in
denying that motion. We agree fully with the
© 2006 Thomson/West No
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district court's conclusions, as they are amply
supported by the record, including the district
court's conclusion that Loy's guilty plea was
knowing *758 and voluntary, and not the product of
fear or intimidation. We address additionally only
the issue of whether Loy had adequate assistance of
counsel in entering into the plea agreement,
including the question of whether he knowingly and
voluntarily waived his right to counsel and decided
to proceed pro se.
Loy argues that he did not waive his right to
counsel, and that his standby counsel was
inadequate to satisfy the Sixth Amendment's
requirement of effective assistance of counsel. "To
ascertain whether [a defendant] knowingly and
intelligently waived his right to counsel, we must
consider 'the total circumstances of the individual
case including background, experience and the
conduct of the accused person.' " United States v.
Weninger, 624 F.2d 163, 164 (10th Cir.1980)
(quoting United States v. Warledo, 557 F.2d 721,
727 (10th Cir. 1977)). For such a waiver to be
valid, it " 'must be made with an apprehension of
the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses
included within them, the range of allowable
punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the
charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof,
and all other facts essential to a broad
understanding of the whole matter.' " Id. (quoting
Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-24, 68
S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948)).
**11 The record in this case reveals that Loy, an
educated professional with some familiarity with the
workings of the judicial system, repeatedly assured
the court that he was in the process of retaining
counsel, only to appear at the next scheduled court
appearance without such an attorney. He also
repeatedly assured the court that he could afford an
attorney. The district court judge repeatedly
warned Loy of the difficulties he would encounter
without an attorney, and, when he represented to the
court that his financial condition had changed such
that he thought he would qualify for appointed
counsel, the court promptly took steps to provide
such counsel. When it turned out that Loy did not
qualify for appointed counsel, the court permitted
him yet more time to make arrangements to retain
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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counsel. Only when Loy appeared yet again
without counsel and asked to be permitted to
represent himself did the court conclude that Loy
had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to
assistance of counsel, after warning Loy repeatedly
of the dangers inherent in representing himself,
cautioning him not to do so, and inquiring whether
the decision he was making was voluntary.
"A defendant's right to obtain counsel of his choice
must be balanced against the need for the efficient
and effective administration of criminal justice."
Id. at 166. And while our court has "recognized a
right of a defendant to proceed without counsel," id
(further quotation omitted), a defendant
may not use this right to play a "cat and mouse"
game with the court ... or by ruse or stratagem
fraudulently seek to have the trial judge placed in a
position where, in moving along the business of the
court, the judge appears to be arbitrarily depriving
the defendant of counsel.
Id. (further quotation omitted). We find that Loy
engaged in just such a "cat and mouse" game. We
hold that his "stubborn failure to hire an attorney
constituted a knowing and intelligent waiver of the
right to assistance of counsel." Id. at 167.FN7

Loy's conduct. The district court was able
to witness that entire course of conduct,
and it clearly found that Loy's statements
and conduct demonstrated an intelligent
and knowing waiver of his right to counsel.
*759 CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the denial
of Loy's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, we
GRANT the government's motion to enforce the
plea agreement and we DISMISS this appeal.
C.A.IO (Kan.),2006.
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FN7. Loy argues that the district court
failed to give proper consideration to
affidavits filed by Meek and Gradert. His
standby counsel Gradert filed one, in
which he expressed his belief that Loy "
entered into the plea of guilty simply to get
released on bond.... [He] was extremely
stressed about the position he was in and
pled because he felt he had no other option.
" Gradert Aff. % 11, R. Vol. I at 65.
Meek also filed an affidavit, describing his
efforts in attempting to arrange for Loy to
hire a very experienced attorney who
charged a minimum fee of $75,000, but
stating that Loy was never able to "come
up with enough money." Meek Aff. \ 7,
id. at 114. Meek also "was concerned
about him representing himself." Meek
Aff. f 8, id. Neither of these attorneys
was able to witness the entire course of
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